This paper considers why "rms often ban monetary exchange between their employees, while encouraging these trades through other means, such as through the reciprocation of favours or barter. Despite classical ine$ciencies associated with non-monetary exchange, we illustrate two themes as to why non-monetary trade may be preferred to allowing money. First, the use of non-monetary trade may a!ect...

Explaining patterns of asset ownership is a central goal of both organizational economics and industrial organization. We develop a model of asset ownership in trucking, which we test by examining how the adoption of different classes of on-board computers (OBCs) between 1987 and 1997 in uenced whether shippers use their own trucks for hauls or contract with for-hire carriers. We Ž nd that OBC...

Mitochondrial ribosomal protein 20 (Mrp20) is a component of the yeast mitochondrial large (54S) ribosomal subunit and is homologous to the bacterial L23 protein, located at the ribosomal tunnel exit site. The carboxy-terminal mitochondrial-specific domain of Mrp20 was found to have a crucial role in the assembly of the ribosomes. A new, membrane-bound, ribosomal-assembly subcomplex composed of...

What is the best way of providing incentives to a team of agents? Agency theory has given a number of answers in the past three decades on the choice between collective and relative incentive provision. We present a broad overview of this rich literature through a simple model. While the early contributions emphasize the role of performance comparison and competition in motivating agents, more ...

We study the optimal design of incentive contracts for experts in different collusion environments, and explore implications for the organization of delegated expertise. We consider a principal relying on experts to gather and report two signals about a project’s value. The principal can have a single expert gather both signals or two experts gather one signal each. We show that absent collusio...

Risk is inherent to the pursuit of opportunity. This paper draws on the recent literature and looks at the risks and opportunities firms and their workers face in the global value chains. First, it examines the sharing mechanisms that firms provide from the national and global perspectives; second, it takes a closer look at the new opportunities and challenges for firms and individuals in the g...

Consider Holmström’s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has an ai-dimensional strategy space and output is m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satis…es budget balance, limited liability and implements an e¢ cient allocation generically exists if and only if Pn i=1 ai=(n 1) < m. Moreover, under a weak additional condition, the equilibrium im...

The institutions of productive systems are structured by mutual interests and relative power. Securing mutually beneficial cooperation in production requires resolving distributional differences. These objectives are secured in liberal economic theory by the working of markets which mediate the power of individuals and reward individual success. The centrality of individuals and hierarchies in ...

A multi-divisional firm can engage in ”winner-picking” to redistribute scarce funds efficiently across divisions. But there is a conflict between rewarding winners (investing) and producing resources internally to reward winners (incentives). Managers in winning divisions are tempted to free-ride on resources produced by managers in loosing division whose incentives to produce resources, antici...

This version of September 3, 2006. German chemical manufacturing industry is marked by two major structural changes during 1992–2004. Firstly, number of firms was ranging extensively: from 676 to 901, while only 96 firms represented balanced panel. Secondly, size of the firm dropped considerably—by 88%. This paper is intended to shed light on both phenomena. Based on reliable census data analys...