The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player ...

Design of complex engineered systems often involves optimization of multiple competing problems that are supposed to compromise to arrive at equilibrium optima, entailing a joint optimization problem. This paper reveals the leader-follower decision structure inherent in joint optimization problems. A Stackelberg game solution is formulated to model a leader-follower joint optimization problem a...

In many species, particular individuals consistently lead group travel. While benefits to followers often are relatively obvious, including access to resources, benefits to leaders are often less obvious. This is especially true for species that feed on patchy mobile resources where all group members may locate prey simultaneously and food intake likely decreases with increasing group size. Lea...

In this paper, we discuss a particular class of Nash games, where the participants game (the players) are divided into two groups (leaders and followers) according to their position or influence on other players. Moreover, consider case, when leaders’ and/or followers’ can be described as potential game. This is subclass games that has been introduced by Monderer Shapley in 1996 beneficial prop...

The paper deals with leader-follower formations of nonholonomic mobile robots, introducing a formation control strategy alternative to those existing in the literature. Robots control inputs are forced to satisfy suitable constraints that restrict the set of leader possible paths and admissible positions of the follower with respect to the leader. A peculiar characteristic of the proposed strat...

This paper addresses a theoretical issue related to combined dynamic traffic assignment and signal control under conditions of congestion through a brief review of previous research and the discussion on interaction between dynamic traffic assignment and signal control. The dynamic characteristics of the interaction are approached using a differential game modeling approach here to formulate th...

We pose Witsenhausen's problem as a leader-follower game of incomplete information. The follower makes noisy observation the leader's action (who moves first) and chooses an minimizing her expected deviation from action. Knowing this, leader who observes realization state that minimizes distance to world ex-ante follower's study perfect Bayesian equilibria identify class “near-piecewise-linear ...

The paper develops four Stackelberg game models to explore the hotels-online travel agencies relationships demonstrate unique optimal solutions under circumstances of non-cooperative decentralization. specific are divided elementally into leaders and followers according roles played; and, they may be further sub-divided types decision variables involving commission rates room rates. Results sho...

To address present and future leadership needs, a model of authentic leader and follower development is proposed and examined with respect to its relationship to veritable, sustainable follower performance. The developmental processes of leader and follower self-awareness and self-regulation are emphasized. The influence of the leader’s and followers’ personal histories and trigger events are c...

With increasing distributed energy resources (DERs) integration, the strategic behavior of a DER aggregator in electricity markets will significantly affect secure operation distribution system. In this paper, interactions among aggregator, and reserve markets, system are investigated through single-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg game model with as leader independent operator followers. To g...