The standard epistemic justification for inclusiveness in political decision making is the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which states that the probability of a correct decision using majority rule increases in group size (given certain assumptions). Informally, majority rule acts as a mechanism to pool the information contained in the judgements of individual agents. I aim to extend the explanation o...

I introduce a model of corporate voting. I characterize the shareholder majority rule as the unique corporate voting rule that satisfies four axioms: anonymity, neutrality, share monotonicity, and merger, a property that requires consistency in election outcomes following stock-for-stock mergers. JEL classification: D71, D72, K22

The ternary Quantum-dot Cellular Automata (tQCA) were demonstrated to be a possible candidate for the implementation of a future multi-valued processing platform. Recent papers show that the application of the adiabatic pipelining can be used to solve the issues of the tQCA logic primitives. The architectures of the resulting tQCAs become similar to their binary counterparts and the physical de...

A median of a k-tuple =(x1; : : : ; xk) of elements of a 0nite metric space (X; d) is an element x for which ∑k i=1 d(x; xi) is minimum. The function m with domain the set of all k-tuples with k ¿ 0 and de0ned by m( ) = {x: x is a median of } is called the median function on X . Continuing with the program of characterizing m on various metric spaces, this paper presents a characterization of t...

In a general bargaining model with a fixed proposer, we show that the agenda setter’s equilibrium payoff is never lower than her payoff in the static model. There is a cutoff level of voter patience such that below the cutoff, the static equilibrium (possibly along with others) obtains; and above the cutoff, all equilibria are in mixed proposal strategies, and the agenda setter does strictly be...

It is shown that the counting function of n Boolean variables can be implemented with the formulae of size O(n3.06) over the basis of all 2-input Boolean functions and of size O(n4.54) over the standard basis. The same bounds follow for the complexity of any threshold symmetric function of n variables and particularly for the majority function. Any bit of the product of binary numbers of length...

1. The Andre'ev (1987) bound: explicit function with size f = ˜ Ω(n 5 2) 2. The relationship between formula size and circuit depth, and how to accomplish " depth reduction " for a general circuit 3. Monotone formulas for monotone functions (example: monotone formula for the majority function MAJ)

Let X be a linearly ordered set of arbitrary size (finite or infinite). Natural functions on such a set one can define using the linear order include maximum, minimum and median functions. While it is clear what the clone generated by the maximum or the minimum looks like, this is not obvious for median functions. We show that every clone on X contains either no median function or all median fu...