The size of adverse selection and moral hazard effects in health insurance markets has important policy implications. For example, if adverse selection effects are small while moral hazard effects are large, conventional remedies for inefficiencies created by adverse selection (e.g., mandatory insurance enrolment) may lead to substantial increases in health care spending. Unfortunately, there i...

so far, moral features have been divided into absolute and relative, individual and social, temporary and permanent and so on. the least advantage of these divisions and separations is a help to moral studies and a better and systematic understanding of moral values and anti-values for moral doers. in this essay according to a cause and effect, and necessary relationship which might be among so...

The efforts of Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Stephen Breyer to provoke examination of the vitality of the American judiciary’s independence have inspired two conferences,1 which in turn have produced many thoughtful papers and much commentary. I have been asked to respond to one such paper offered by Professors Paul Carrington of Duke and Roger Cramton of Cornell.2 These two distinguished sc...

To obtain higher yields, farmers may excessively use pesticides when they grow crops (like rice, vegetables, or fruit), causing moral hazard behavior. This paper examines how Chinese farmers’ moral hazard behavior in crop production is influenced by their traditional culture. A semi-parametric logistic model is used to investigate the impact of Chinese traditional culture on farmers’ moral haza...

We provide an equilibrium asset pricing formula under moral hazard on the assumption of a power utility function and an endogenous riskless rate. Moral hazard is defined here as a firm’s change of measure that is incontractible. We show explicitly in closed form that moral hazard distorts asset prices by (1) moving the market price of diffusive risk in the opposite direction to an investor’s ma...

We analyze the effect of counterparty risk on insurance contracts using the case of credit risk transfer in banking. In addition to the familiar moral hazard problem caused by the insured’s ability to influence the probability of a claim, this paper uncovers a new moral hazard problem on the other side of the market. We show that the insurer’s investment strategy may not be in the best interest...

In this paper, I argue that it is quite useful, both theoretically and empirically, to adopt a sociocultural approach to the study of moral development. This entails viewing ‘moral functioning’ as a form of mediated action, and moral development as the process by which persons gradually appropriate a variety of ‘moral mediational means’. Mediated action entails two central elements: an ‘agent’,...