In this paper, we consider a novel $M$ -ary sequential hypothesis testing problem in which an adversary is present and perturbs the distributions of samples before decision maker observes them. This formulated as adversarial game play...

In this paper we present a method for using rational expectations in a linearquadratic optimization framework with learning. We present a method that allows a policy maker to derive an optimal policy in the presence of rational expectations and the possibility of parameter drift. In this fashion the Lucas critique can be mitigated.

This paper constructs a dynamic game model to address the following groundwater management problem, where quantity and quality of the water are taken into account. A group of farmers overexploits a groundwater stock and causes excessive pollution. A water agency wishes to regulate the farmers' activity, in order to reach a minimum level of quantity and quality but is subject to a budget constra...

Regret minimization is an effective technique for almost surely producing Nash equilibrium policies in coordination games in the strategic form. Decentralized POMDPs offer a realistic model for sequential coordination problems, but they yield doubly exponential sized games in the strategic form. Recently, counterfactual regret has offered a way to decompose total regret along a (extensive form)...

Potential-based reward shaping can significantly improve the time needed to learn an optimal policy and, in multiagent systems, the performance of the final joint-policy. It has been proven to not alter the optimal policy of an agent learning alone or the Nash equilibria of multiple agents learning together. However, a limitation of existing proofs is the assumption that the potential of a stat...

This paper is an addendum to the ‘Unilateralist’s Curse’ paper of Nick Bostrom, Thomas Douglas and Anders Sandberg [BDS12]. It demonstrates that if there are identical agents facing a situation where any one of them can implement a policy unilaterally, then the best strategies they can implement are also Nash equilibriums. It also notes that if this Nash equilibrium involves probabilistic react...

The paper studies the cumulative proportional reinforcement (CPR) rule, according to which an agent plays, at each period, an action with a probability proportional to the cumulative utility that the agent has obtained with that action. the asymptotic properties of this learning process are examined for a decision-maker under risk, where it converges almost surely toward the expected utility ma...

This paper studies the e ects of vertical integration on innovation in the chipset and smartphone industries. I formulate and estimate a dynamic structural model of a dominant upstream chipset maker and downstream smartphone handset makers. The two sides make dynamic investment decisions and negotiate chipset prices via Nash bargaining. Using the estimates, I simulate market outcomes should the...

This paper presented an experimental system for modeling the theory of decisions and games under ambiguous beliefs. It can be stated as the three-layer modeling of a decision maker who has ambiguous beliefs represented by the belief functions (BEL), will maximize the Choquet expected utility (CEU), and to play the Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (NEUU). By using Prolog, the author has develo...