We propose a unified framework to study relational contracting and hold-up problems in infinite horizon stochastic games. We first illustrate that with respect to long run decisions, the common formulation of relational contracts as Pareto-optimal public perfect equilibria is in stark contrast to fundamental assumptions of hold-up models. We develop a model in which relational contracts are rep...

Relational contracts typically combine explicit terms that are third-party enforceable with implicit components that can be adjusted at the parties’ discretion. While discretionary ex post adjustments lies at the heart of relational contracting, previous empirical research has been primarily motivated by the repeat purchase mechanism (RPM) of Klein and Leffler (1981), which is a relational cont...

Can formal contracts help resolving the holdup problem? We address this important question by studying the holdup problem in repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer in which the seller can make relation-specific investments in each period. In contrast to previous findings, we demonstrate that writing a simple fixed-price contract based on product delivery is of value even when relati...

This paper examines the development of legal contract enforcement in a political economy context. The key insight is that, in earlier times when relational contracts are used predominantly, the rich elite agents must have enjoyed comparative advantages in using relational contracts than the poor and thus would bene…t less from investing in legal enforcement. The paper …nds that high income ineq...

This paper provides a theoretical rationale for non-binding retail price recommendations (RPRs) in vertical supply relations. Analyzing a bilateral manufacturer-retailer relationship with repeated trade, we show that linear relational contracts can implement the surplus-maximizing outcome. If the manufacturer has private information about production costs or consumer demand, RPRs may serve as a...

Effective collaboration within and between organizations requires efficient adaptation to unforeseen change. We study how parties build relational contracts that achieve this goal. focus on the “clarity problem”—whether have a shared understanding of promises they make each other. Specifically, (a) buyer seller play trading game in several periods; (b) know their environment will change but do ...