Introduction Our research on reuse contracts demonstrated how a better documentation of the dependencies between reusable assets and their reusers can help in managing the evolution of reusable assets and in achieving disciplined reuse. However, in trying to apply our results to product lines we still encounter multiple problems. This position paper shortly introduces reuse contracts and then r...

In this paper we develop methods to investigate the efficiency of alternative contracts for Carbon (C) sequestration in cropland soils, taking into account the spatial heterogeneity of agricultural production systems and the costs of implementing more efficient contracts. We describe contracts being proposed for implementation in the United States and other countries that would pay farmers for ...

This article provides a non-technical survey on recent topics in the theory of contracts. The hold-up problem is presented and the incomplete contracts approach is discussed. Emphasis is put on conceptual problems and open questions that await further research.

We analyze venture capital (VC) investments in twenty-three non-U.S. countries and compare them to U.S. VC investments. We describe how the contracts allocate cash flow, board, liquidation, and other control rights. In univariate analyses, contracts differ across legal regimes. However, more experienced VCs implement U.S.-style contracts regardless of legal regime. In most specifications, legal...

Smart contracts are computer programs that are executed by a network of mutually distrusting agents, without the need of an external trusted authority. Smart contracts handle and transfer assets of considerable value (in the form of crypto-currency like Bitcoin). Hence, it is crucial that their implementation is bug-free. We identify the utility (or expected payoff) of interacting with such sma...

We analyze explicit and implicit contracts in a repeated principal-agent model with observable but only partially contractible actions of the agent. It is shown that the set of implementable actions may increase or decrease if additional actions become contractible. We would like to thank Bengt Holmstrr om who stimulated this research several years ago by telling an anecdote about the insuucien...

Incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in (respectively) implicit and explicit incentive contracts. We show that the presence of sufficiently effective explicit contracts can render all implicit contracts inf...

In spite of the prevalence of IT outsourcing, the outcome of IT outsourcing contracts have been less than stellar. However, despite industry reports about dissatisfaction with the performance of IT outsourcing initiatives, there is a lack of research examining the outcome of IT outsourcing contracts. Given the difficulties in selecting appropriate vendors and designing outsourcing contracts, sp...