نتایج جستجو برای: sanction jel classification f12

تعداد نتایج: 505101  

2008
DANIEL HOUSER ERTE XIAO KEVIN MCCABE VERNON SMITH James Andreoni Colin Camerer Tyler Cowen John Dickhaut David Dickinson

People can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and previous research suggests both "intentions" and incentives underlie this effect. We report data from an experiment aimed at determining the relative importance of intentions and incentives in producing non-cooperative behavior. Participants play a one-shot investment experiment in pairs. Investors send an amount to trustees...

2012
Maria Bigoni Gabriele Camera Marco Casari

Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment among Students and Clerical Workers We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Coop...

2017
Corey Lang

Transportation costs are of central importance in the New Economic Geography literature, though assumptions about transportation costs continue to be simplistic. This paper begins to address these simplifications by assuming that transportation costs for manufactured goods are heterogeneous. Basic results are consistent with standard models showing dispersion of economic activity for high trans...

2003
Michael Pflüger

This paper sets up a two country monopolistic competition model with intra-industry trade to study the effects of an exogenous differential in wage and social policies on the location of industry. Two model scenarios are considered. In the traditional one with physical capital, such a differential induces a relocation effect which increases with the level of trade integration. The ‘new economic...

2002
Ozgur Kayalica Rafael E. Ramirez

We examine the effects of mergers and internal groups (lobbies) in shaping national policies towards foreign direct investment. Lobbying is modeled following the political contributions approach. In this work we develop a partial equilibrium model of an oligopolistic industry in which a number of domestic and foreign firms compete in the market for a homogeneous good in a host country. It is as...

2002
Odd Rune Straume

This paper analyses the scope for collusive behaviour within the context of an international duopoly supergame in which both firms and monopoly labour unions interact strategically. We find that the presence of unions, implying an endogenisation of production costs, dramatically alters the incentives for inter-firm collusion. There are, however, strong incentives for the unions to collude, rais...

2008
Michael Pflüger Takatoshi Tabuchi

This paper studies the role of land as a factor of production in a simple monopolistic competition model of trade and geography. Overall we find that land for production is a powerful dispersion force. More specifically, we show that, in contrast to the new trade literature, a larger country will have lower wages, in general. Moreover, allowing for labor mobility, we show that agglomeration is ...

2016
Thorsten Hansen

This paper studies the impact of trade liberalization in terms of tariff cuts within the Eastern European enlargement on German and Austrian firm productivity. Unique matching of data from 1994 to 2003 suggests that tariff reductions raise parent firm productivity significantly. A ten percentage point decrease in tariff rates can lead to total factor productivity gains of up to 2 percent. The d...

 Based on the recent literature of heterogeneous firms, productive firms self select themselves into foreign markets. In this framework, there is a productivity rise prior to exporting. On the other words, different export performance across firms is linked to their heterogeneity.   The main purpose of the present paper is to examine the so-called hypothesis of heterogeneous firm in Iran. For ...

Journal: :Games and Economic Behavior 2008
Daniel Houser Erte Xiao Kevin McCabe Vernon L. Smith

People can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and previous research suggests both "intentions" and incentives underlie this effect. We report data from an experiment aimed at determining the relative importance of intentions and incentives in producing non-cooperative behavior. Participants play a one-shot investment experiment in pairs. Investors send an amount to trustees...

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