Digital watermarking protocols are the one, which have combined fingerprinting technique with watermarking, for embedding digital signal or watermark into an original multimedia object. Buyer-seller watermarking protocol is fundamentally applied to continue the digital rights of both buyers and seller. We proposed an identity-based buyer-seller watermarking protocol that encounters various weak...

We study a buyer-seller problem in which the good is information and there are no property rights. The buyer is reluctant to pay for information whose value he does not know, but the seller cannot credibly reveal this value without disclosing the information itself. Information comes as divisible hard evidence. We show how the seller can appropriate a substantial fraction of the value through g...

A buyer wishes to purchase a good from a seller who chooses a sequence of prices over time. In each period, the buyer can also exercise an outside option such as moving onto another seller. We show there is a unique equilibrium in which the seller charges a constant price in every period equal to the monopoly price against their residual demand. This result contravenes the Coase conjecture.

the secure embedding scheme (see Section II), it is hard to generate a watermarked version of c which has a low correlation with k 0. An estimation attack usually yields a watermarked object that still correlates well with k 0 ; a judge will reject the accusation on such an object, as it can only originate from a malicious seller (k 0 is only available to the seller). • Finally, can attempt to ...

We study the second-price offer feature of eBay auctions in which the seller has multiple units. Perhaps surprisingly, the opportunity to make second-chance offers can reduce seller profit. This happens if her marginal cost function is sufficiently steep. Hence, sellers should be wary about the possibility that buyers anticipate second-chance offers, and it may be advantageous for a seller to a...

This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers’ valuations through an unobservable ex ante investment. The key insight is that the optimal mechanism may have the seller play a mixed investment strategy so as to create correlation between the otherwise (conditionally) independent valuations of buyers. The paper establishes conditions under which the seller can, i...