The exact linear dependency among age, period and birth cohort makes it impossible to recover the true parameters of Age-Period-Cohort (APC) models. We then propose extract reliable information from APC models via Shapley decomposition, a model-agnostic procedure game theory that allows pin down most likely contribution each regressor in explaining variance dependent variable. rationale is pred...

The purpose of this paper is to extend the following result by Monderer et al. (1992): the set of weighted Shapley values includes the Core in TU games. We extend the result to the class of uniformly positively smooth NTU games. We focus on two solution concepts which extend the weighted Shapley value. First, we focus on the weighted Egalitarian solution introduced by Kalai and Samet (1985). We...

A well known and simple game to model markets is the glove game where worth is produced by building matching pairs. For glove games, diff erent concepts, like the Shapley value, the restricted Shapley value or the Owen value, yield diff erent distributions of worth. Moreover, computational eff ort of these values is in general very high. This paper provides effi cient allocation formulas of the...

The Shapley Value is arguably the most important normative solution concept in coalitional games. One of its applications is in the domain of networks, where the Shapley Value is used to measure the relative importance of individual nodes. This measure, which is called node centrality, is of paramount significance in many real-world application domains including social and organisational networ...

We investigate the application of Shapley value to quantifying contribution a tuple query answer. The is widely known numerical measure in cooperative game theory and many applications for assessing player coalition game. It has been established already 1950s, theoretically justified by being very single wealth-distribution that satisfies some natural axioms. While this investigated several are...

The main aim of this article is to compare the results of classical Shapley value concept with results of the Shapley value extended to the cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions applied on the real data of the cooperative simple game – in this case the data from the voting in the Lower House of the Czech Parliament 20022012. One of the most intriguing tasks is to describe real system problems...