For undiscounted two-person zero-sum communicating stochastic games with finite state and action spaces, a solution procedure is proposed that exploits the communication property, i.e., working with irreducible games over restricted strategy spaces. The proposed procedure gives the value of the communicating game with an arbitrarily small error when the value is independent of the initial state.

A dual for linear programming problems with fuzzy parameters is introduced and it is shown that a two person zero sum matrix game with fuzzy pay-o(s is equivalent to a primal-dual pair of such fuzzy linear programming problems. Further certain di6culties with similar studies reported in the literature are discussed.

The Nash equilibria of a two-person, non-zero-sum game are the solutions of a certain linear complementarity problem (LCP). In order to use this for solving a game in extensive form, the game must first be converted to a strategic description such as the normal form. The classical normal form, however, is often exponentially large in the size of the game tree. If the game has perfect recall, a ...

As in optimal control theory, linear quadratic (LQ) differential games (DG) can be solved, even in high dimension, via a Riccati equation. However, contrary to the control case, existence of the solution of the Riccati equation is not necessary for the existence of a closed-loop saddle point. One may “survive” a particular, non generic, type of conjugate point. An important application of LQDG’...

Consider a two-person zero-sum stochastic game with Borel state space S, compact metric action sets A, B and law of motion q such that the integral under q of every bounded Borel measurable function depends measurably on the initial state s and continuously on the actions (a,b) of the players. Suppose the payoff is a bounded function f of the infinite history of states and actions such that f i...

In this paper, we investigate the use of reciprocative strategy to induce cooperative behavior in non-zero-sum games. Reciprocative behavior is defined mathematically in the context of a two-person non-zero-sum game in which both the players have a common set of pure strategies. Conditions under which mutual cooperative behavior results when one of the players responds optimally to reciprocativ...

In repeated games with incomplete information, rational agents must carefully weigh the tradeoffs of advantageously exploiting their information to achieve a short-term gain versus carefully concealing their information so as not to give up a long-term informed advantage. The theory of infinitelyrepeated two-player zero-sum games with incomplete information has been carefully studied, beginning...

A complex system exhibiting uncertainty as well randomness may be portrayed by an uncertain random singular difference equation. This paper investigates two-person nonzero-sum and zero-sum games based on equations. First, approach is proposed to translate the game into equivalent for a standard dynamic system. The relevant recursive equations are developed search Nash equilibrium converted game...

We briefly introduce and discuss two two-player non-zero-sum games, mainly to illustrate that such games are substantially more complex to investigate than zero-sum games. Actually, the key aspect of such games is that the sum of the pay-offs to the two players is not constant over all pairs of strategies, as constant sum games are equivalent to zero-sum games (think about this; one can imagine...