We propose a decision making process meant to mimic human behavior. This process is implemented with computational agents. We use this computational testbed to run simulations of two coordination games, the minimum-effort coordination game and the battle of the sexes game. We find that the computational agents exhibit behavior similar to human subjects from previous experimental work. We then u...

We show how to calibrate CES production and utility functions when indirect taxation affecting inputs and consumption is present. These calibrated functions can then be used in computable general equilibrium models. Taxation modifies the standard calibration procedures since any taxed good has two associated prices and a choice of reference value units has to be made. We also provide an example...

In this paper we study a binomial model with random time steps and explain how to calculate values for European and American call and put options. We prove both weak convergence of the discrete processes to the Black}Scholes setup and convergence of the values for European and American put options. Computational experiments exhibit a smooth convergence structure and suggest that we can obtain a...

This paper extends the club model of religion to better account for observed patterns of extremism. We adapt existing models to a multi-agent framework and analyze the distribution of agents and clubs. We find that extremism is more successful when religious groups are able to produce close substitutes for standard goods and that increased access to publicly provided goods can reduce the extrem...

We explore the effect of the limited ability to process information on the convergence of firms toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot oligopoly with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that while market production is close to equilibrium, firm production is relatively far fro...

We show existence of equilibria in distributional strategies for a wide class of private value auctions, including the rst general existence result for double auctions. The set of equilibria is invariant to the tie-breaking rule. The model incorporates multiple unit demands, all standard pricing rules, reserve prices, entry costs, and stochastic demand and supply. Valuations can be correlated a...

The UK Government is committed to abolishing fuel poverty amongst vulnerable households by the year 2010 and in the general population by 2016, but definition and measurement of fuel poverty remains controversial. We define a new measure of subjective household experience and explore links between this measure and the official objective definition, using a unique data set and the Family Expendi...

We model the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly framework. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma type game, but also must learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters. We study the prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm to learn the environment and its rival’s output. We show how a firm’s profit and cooperation rates are...

We present an agent-based model of endogenous merger formation in a market with turnover of market participants. We describe the dynamics of the model and identify the conditions under which market competition is sufficiently disrupted to prompt extended periods during which mergers are desirable. We also demonstrate how merger waves can be triggered by industry shocks and firm overconfidence. ...

We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. ...