نتایج جستجو برای: طبقهبندی jel d23 j41

تعداد نتایج: 27762  

2005
PETER ZEMSKY

We study how diversity evolves at a firm with entry-level and upper-level employees who vary in ability and "type" (gender or ethnicity). The ability of entry-level employees is increased by mentoring. An employee receives more mentoring when more upper-level employees have the same type. Optimal promotions are biased by type, and this bias may favor either the minority or the majority. We char...

2000
Margaret Stevens

This paper analyses the contract-posting equilibrium in a general equilibrium matching model of the labour market with on-the-job turnover. Privately optimal contracts have a rising wage-tenure profile, even when productivity is constant. The effect is to reduce equilibrium turnover; when jobs differ in productivity, turnover is below the level required for efficient matching of workers to jobs...

2012
Alain Delacroix

Wage determination under asymmetric information generates ine¢ ciencies due to excess turnover. Layo¤ taxes can improve e¢ ciency. We show that ine¢ cient separations can even be fully removed with …xed separation taxes in the case where the relevant private information is exponentially distributed. With search frictions, such policies a¤ect the fallback option of labor market participants, hen...

2001
Paul Bingley Tor Eriksson

We test predictions from theories of tournament, fairness and tastes for skewness about the effects of pay spread and skewness on employee effort and firm productivity. The data come from the population of 6,501 medium-to-large sized Danish private sector firms matched with all their employees during 1992-95. Potential simultaneity problems are addressed by instrumental variables provided by in...

2003
Per Engström

This paper explores the rationale for unemployment beneÞts as a complement to optimal non-linear income taxation. High-skilled workers and low-skilled workers face different exogenous risks of being unemployed. As long as the low-skilled workers face a higher unemployment risk, we Þnd that there is a case for over-insuring the lowskilled, hence the unemployment beneÞts of the low-skilled should...

Journal: : 2021

ÖRGÜTSEL DESTEK ALGISININ İŞE TUTKUNLUK ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ: CİNSİYETİN DÜZENLEYİCİ ROLÜ ÖZET Bu çalışmanın amacı; işe tutkunluk ile örgütsel destek algısı ilişkisini tespit etmek ve düzeyinin demografik değişkenlere göre farklılık oluşturup oluşturmayacağını test etmektir. Ayrıca araştırmanın diğer bir amacı, algısının üzerindeki etkisinde cinsiyetin düzenleyici rolünü Araştırmada veriler anket ...

2003
Nicolás Garrido Andrea Leonardi

In addition to the common analysis of the Kauffman NK model where the value of K and the structure of interaction is given, the aim of this paper is to study what would be the values of these two parameters if they were endogenized. Thus, a model is proposed where firms and business schools coordinate to search for high peaks in their respective landscapes using evolutionary algorithms. The mai...

2012
Alexander Dilger

Performance pay, at least as usually understand, is no good idea for non-executive directors. They have to supervise and control or in some situations even to fire and replace the executive managers. This means that their performance as supervisors is totally different from the performance of the supervised executive managers and even the company at large. Moreover, they are mostly interested i...

2000
Andreas Ortmann Richard Squire

We provide a game-theoretic model of academic organizations, focusing on the strategic interaction of prototypical overseers, administrators, and professors. By identifying key principal-agent games routinely played in colleges and universities, we begin to unpack the black box typically used to conceptualize these institutions. Our approach suggests an explanation for the seemingly inevitable ...

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2006
Marco Battaglini

Consider Holmström’s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has an ai-dimensional strategy space and output is m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satis…es budget balance, limited liability and implements an e¢ cient allocation generically exists if and only if Pn i=1 ai=(n 1) < m. Moreover, under a weak additional condition, the equilibrium im...

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