Institutional economists concerned with rules often focus on the trade-off between individuals and social incentives. This paper argues that the real trade-off that individuals face is between the organizations they belong to in contrast to social rules, and asks when do individuals find it in their interests to act in the interests of their organizations and when do they support impersonal rul...

I develop awareness-dependent subjective expected utility by taking unawareness structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006, 2008, 2009) as primitives in the Anscombe-Aumann approach to subjective expected utility. I observe that a decision maker is unaware of an event if and only if her choices reveal that the event is “null” and the negation of the event is “null”. Moreover, I...

Abstract In this article, we use a laboratory experiment to study the effects of relational contracts on market efficiency in environments with different degrees contract enforceability and competition. By exogenously varying communication protocol, create that are more personal or impersonal. On one hand, improve by promoting trust coordination. other impersonal increase facilitating severance...

Recent findings suggest that exerting executive control influences responses to moral dilemmas. In our study, subjects judged how morally appropriate it would be for them to kill one person to save others. They made these judgments in 24 dilemmas that systematically varied physical directness of killing, personal risk to the subject, inevitability of the death, and intentionality of the action....