This paper presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural non-point-source pollution. The analysis is based on a nested agent framework with three parties; farmers, a country’s government, and the governments of all countries that affect each other’s environmental quality. Unlike previous analysis of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest non-individual contracts ...

Alan L. Olmstead is Professor of Economics and Director of the Institute of Governmental Affairs at the University of California, Davis, 95616, and member of the Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics. E-mail: [email protected]. Paul W. Rhode is Professor of Economics at the University of Arizona, Tucson, 85721-0108 and Research Associate at the NBER. E-mail: [email protected].

a Department of Earth & Environment, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199, USA b Department of Economics, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199, USA c Department of Economics, Fairfield University, Fairfield, CT 06824, USA d Virginia Bioinformatics Institute, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA e Dept. of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Virginia Tech, Blacksbur...

Department of Entomology and Nematology, Department of Plant Sciences, and Department of Biological and Agricultural Engineering, University of California, Davis, CA 95616, USA Center for the Economics and Demography of Aging, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA Laboratory of Entomology and Agricultural Zoology, School of Agricultural Sciences, University of Thessaly, Phytokoy St....