The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the concept of satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includes it as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach. JEL classification: C72; C92; D01

We propose an allocation rule that takes into account the importance of players and their links. Since a network describes the interaction structure between agents, our allocation rule covers both bilateral and multilateral interactions. We provide a characterization of this rule in terms of well known axioms and compare it to other allocation rules in the literature. JEL classifications: A14; ...

In a convincing analysis of the conditions and strength of altruism, Bester and Güth [Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 34, 1998, 193-209] unfortunately restrict the interpretation of their results. Their paper provides us with an analysis of the conditions and strength of malevolence (or envy) as well. ©2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: A13; C7...

We study repeated games where players observe noisy private signals about the unknown state of the world in every period. We find a sufficient condition under which the folk theorem obtains by ex-post equilibria. Our condition is satisfied for generic signal distributions as long as each player has at least two possible private signals. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72...

We prove existence of equilibria in bipartite social games, where players choose both a strategy in a game and a partner with whom to play the game. Such social games generalize the well-known marriage problem where players choose partners, but there are no endogenous choices subsequent to a matching. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: A14, C71, C72, C78, J41.

Vega-Redondo (1997) showed that imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome in Cournot Oligopoly. We generalize his result to aggregative quasi-submodular games. Examples are the Cournot Oligopoly, Bertrand games with differentiated complementary products, CommonPool Resource games, Rent-Seeking games and generalized Nash-Demand games. JEL-Classifications: C72, D21, D43, L13.

We show in a sender-receiver game with strictly opposing interests that rewards enhance trust but do not influence truth-telling. Subjects who reward tend to tell the truth and trust more often in the presence and absence of reward opportunities. The amount of obtained rewards thereby enhances truth-telling. JEL Classification: C72, C73, D83.

This paper outlines the evolution of the theory of economic policy from the classical contributions of Frisch, Hansen, Tinbergen and Theil to situations of strategic interaction. Andrew Hughes Hallett has taken an active and relevant part in this evolution, having contributed to both the development and recent rediscovery of the classical theory, with possible relevant applications for model bu...

If an aggregative game satisfies the generalized Hahn conditions, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, which may not be interior and is globally stable under two alternative continuous adjustment processes with non-negativity constraints. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D43, L13.

This paper provides an introduction to the analysis of games with strategic complementarities and applications to industrial organization: oligopoly pricing, comparative statics and a taxonomy of strategic behavior in two-stage games. D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; L13