BACKGROUND Transformational change in health care calls on hospital boards of trustees to engage in quality ata level that has never been asked before. Yet little research has been conducted regarding the role of hospital governance in quality. METHODS Interviews were conducted with chief executive officers (CEOs) and board chairpersons from aconvenient sample of 30 hospitals, representing 14...

We examine the payoffs to shareholders and CEOs of aggressive real behaviors and aggressive reporting behaviors. Using instruments selected from prior literature to construct latent variables for each aggressiveness construct, we estimate a structural equations model of the associations between the two constructs, and between the constructs and payoffs to shareholders (returns) and to CEOs (com...

On the Determinants of Pay of CEOs in UK Public Sector Higher Education Institutions The pay determining process of CEOs of UK higher education institutions is modelled using three econometric methodologies applied to a large and unique dataset for the academic years 1997/98 through to 2005/06. A gender differential in pay is detected and this differential remains robust across the specificatio...

Our study extends upper-echelons theory by introducing CEO narcissism as a formal construct for explaining company strategy and performance. Drawing on psychological research indicating that narcissism is a personality dimension, rather than just a pathological disorder, we argue that narcissism in CEOs is positively related to strategic dynamism and grandiosity, and it engenders extreme and vo...

We empirically examine how governance structure affects the design of executive compensation contracts and, in particular, the implicit weights of firm performance measures in CEO compensation. We find that compensation contracts in firms with higher takeover protection and where the CEO has more influence on governance decisions put more weight on accounting-based measures of performance (retu...

NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms are required to have a majority of independent directors starting 2004. Since the regulation can weaken CEO influence over the board, affected CEOs may counter it by building a closely aligned team of top executives to strengthen their structural power. Using a differences-indifferences approach, we find that affected CEOs fill their executive suites with significan...

Does culture shape economic preferences? While economic models of the origins of preferences point to an important role of culture, supporting empirical evidence is largely missing for risk and time preferences. In this study, we exploit variation in cultural heritage across CEOs of public U.S. companies and demonstrate that CEOs’ culturally inherited attitudes towards uncertainty and risk nega...

This paper explains why CEOs are unable to curtail risky investments before a crisis. CEOs rely on the advice of their employees to understand the riskiness of their investments. When employees observe noisy signals, they may be reluctant to disclose their information for the fear of getting fired. So, the CEO needs to offer contracts which provide incentive to disclose their information. The p...

Article history: Received 17 September 2013 Received in revised form 1 March 2014 Accepted 11 March 2014 Available online 19 March 2014 Most studies consider chief executive officer (CEO) turnover from the firm's perspective. In this paper, I suggest that the labor market conditions for CEOs affect turnover outcomes. I use CEOs' positions on corporate executive and director networks to assess t...