We investigate advertising level, pricing and production decision problems in a supply chain when demand and cost disruptions occur simultaneously. The channel consists of one manufacturer and one retailer where demand depends on retail price and advertisement expenditure. We examine the case in both cooperative game and non-cooperative Stackelberg game.

This article describes the basic elements of the cooperative approach to game theory, one of the two counterparts of the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two of the most central solution concepts in cooperative game theory. JEL classification: C7.

Forming effective coalitions is a major research challenge in AI and multi-agent systems. Thus, cooperative games, including Coalition Structure Generation (CSG), have been attracting considerable attention from the AI research community. Traditionally, the input of a cooperative game is a black-box function called a characteristic function. Therefore, many problems in cooperative games, includ...

A game of group pursuit in which players move on a plane with bounded velocities is considered. The game is supposed to be a nonzerosum simple pursuit game between an evader and m pursuers acting independent of each other. The case of complete information is studied. In other words, each player, choosing control variables at each time instant t > 0, knows the moment t and his own as well as all...

In this paper, we give a further discussion on the core solution for cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs. Some notions and results from classical games are extended to fuzzy cooperative games. Using an example, we point out that the theorem about the nonempty of I-core proposed in 2008 was not sufficient. Furthermore, the equivalence relation between balanced game and nonempty core, which play...

We consider stochastic cooperative game and give it the definition of the Owen value, which is obtained by extending the classical case. Then we provide explicit expression for the Owen value of the stochastic cooperative game and discuss its existence and uniqueness.

Here we present a ground-breaking new postulate for game theory. The first part of this postulate contains the axiomatic observation that all games are created by a designer, whether they are: e.g., (dynamic/static) or (stationary/non-stationary) or (sequential/one-shot) non-cooperative games, and importantly, whether or not they are intended to represent a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, the...

A game on a convex geometry was introduced by Bilbao as a model of partial cooperation. We investigate some properties of the core of a game on a convex geometry. First, we show that if a game is quasi-convex, then the core is stable. This result can be seen as an extension of a result by Shapley for traditional cooperative games. Secondly, we show the core on the class of balanced games on a c...

This survey paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from non-cooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. Solutions to games where players have a continuous choice about how much to pollute, games where players make decisions about treaty participation, and games whe...