This paper studies equilibrium incentives in a vertically differentiated duopoly with price competition. We analyze one simultaneous-move game and two sequential-move games. In a simultaneous-move game, firms' managers determine their prices simultaneously in the first stage of the game and in the second stage two firms determine incentive schemes. One sequential-move game considers the case in...

The endogenous choice of timing is discussed in a vertically di®erentiated duopoly where quality improvement requires a ̄xed convex cost. The timing decision concerns the quality stage. Using an extended game with observable delay, it is shown that only simultaneous equilibria can arise. This puts into question the ability of Stackelberg games to describe the entry process. J.E.L. classi ̄cation...

We construct a market based mechanism that induces players in a non-cooperative game to make the same choices as characterize cooperation. We then argue that this mechanism is applicable to a wide range of economic questions and illustrate this claim using the problems of ”The Tragedy of the Commons” and ”R&D Spillovers in Duopoly”. JEL: .C72, D62, H40.

We study a two-period duopoly game with capacity accumulation under demand uncertainty, production and time-to-build constraints. These considerations are relevant in network industries such as electricity markets and hot spot markets.We characterize and compare open-loop, Markov perfect and closed-loop Nash equilibrium investments.

Abstract Bounded rationality, asymmetric information and foreign trade are widespread in the economic market, have been studied extensively oligopoly games, but there not many works discussing bounded rationality supply chain hybrid game. In contrast with existing works, our study, we innovatively construct a duopoly Bertrand–Cournot game model transnational information. It is assumed that upst...

Dynamic game theory is applied to analyze the timber market in northern Iran as a duopsony. The Nash equilibrium and the dynamic properties of the system based on marginal adjustments are determined. When timber is sold, the different mills use mixed strategies to give sealed bids. It is found that the decision probability combination of the different mills follow a special form of attractor an...