A social network in which individuals seek to be early adopters of a popular trend has as its equilibrium structure a (unique) leader and hierarchy of followers. The analysis generating this equilibrium fails to offer a mechanism for the equilibrium to emerge from an initially unstructured social environment. A dynamic model with evolving social links is employed to test for and understand the ...

For duopoly models, we analyse the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric coarse correlated equilibria. Any small unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.

For duopoly models, we analyse the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric coarse correlated equilibria. Any small unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.

We map induced supply and demand environments to equivalent general equilibrium economies. This general equilibrium structure facilitates reinterpretation of bargaining models and market experiments, typically formulated as partial equilibrium environments, in the framework of implementation in general equilibrium economies. We reinterpret results of and relationships among several bargaining m...

Digital technology is costly, but it allows insurers to more quickly learn about the risk type of their policyholders. We study the implications of this speed-versus-cost tradeoff for equilibrium pricing and coverage decisions in an insurance market featuring adverse selection. In particular, we develop a theoretical model of dynamic competitive equilibrium featuring individuals who differ in t...