The idea that something about cognition lies outside the brain and even the skin is central to a number of significant recent developments in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Loosely grouped under the label, ‘situated cognition’, all variants of this view hold that the various contexts of cognition are crucial to it in some way. However, there is a big division over what way. Indeed, t...

This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the d...

The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the ...

The hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) claims that the cognitive processes materially realise thinking are sometimes partially constituted by entities located external to an agent’s body in its local environment. We show how proponents HEC need not claim agent must have a central nervous system, or physically instantiate organised such way as play causal role equivalent brain if is be capab...

I discuss Clark’s predictive processing/extended mind hybrid, diagnosing a problem: hybrid suggests that, when we use them, pay attention to mind-extending external resources. This clashes with commonly accepted necessary condition of cognitive extension; namely, that resources must be phenomenally transparent used. then propose solution this problem claiming the phenomenal transparency should ...

In a rich and thought-provoking paper, Lambros Malafouris argues that taking material culture seriously means to be ‘systematically concerned with figuring out the causal efficacy of materiality in the enactment and constitution of a cognitive system or operation’ (Malafouris 2004, 55). As I understand this view, there are really two intertwined claims to be established. The first is that the t...

Das bis heute gültig scheinende Ziel der mit künstlicher Intelligenz befassten wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft ist die Hervorbringung von Artificial Minds [Fr95], vom Menschen losgelöster, künstlich intelligenter Systeme. Diesen wird hier das wesentlich menschgebundene Konzept des Artificial Memory (AM) gegenübergestellt. AM leitet sich aus der vorwiegend philosophischen Diskussion des Extended...

Some types of animals exploit the external environment to support their cognitive processes, in the sense of patterns created in the environment that function as external mental states and serve as an extension to their mind. In the case of social animals the creation and exploitation of such patterns can be shared, thus obtaining a form of shared mind or collective intelligence. This paper exp...