In this paper, we consider a network game where players are multi-agent systems (we call them in paper "coalitions") under the condition that trajectories of (coalitions) should (have no common arcs, or have vertices) i. e. must not intersect. same time inside coalition can intersect arcs,or vertices). The last complicates problem, since sets strategies turn out to be mutually dependent. A fami...

Centrality measures are commonly used to detect important nodes. There some metrics that measure a node's connectivity different communities. This paper extends the standard network centrality and proposes estimate importance of nodes in as solution cooperative game. Three ways defining such game introduced. Each them uses concept clique graph. Examples considered

the shapley value, one of the most common solution concepts of cooperative game theory is defined and axiomatically characterized in different game-theoretic models. certainly, the shapley value can be used in interesting sharing cost/reward problems in the operations research area such as connection, routing, scheduling, production and inventory situations. in this paper, we focus on the shapl...