An equilibrium search model of the labor market is combined with a social network. The key features are that the workers’ network transmits information about jobs and that wages and entry of firms are determined in equilibrium. In the baseline model workers are homogeneous and referrals are used to mitigate search frictions. When worker heterogeneity is added referrals also facilitate the hirin...

The relationship between social segregation and workplace segregation had been traditionally studied as a one-way causal relationship mediated by referral hiring. In this paper we introduce an alternative framework which describes the dynamic relationships between social segregation, workplace segregation, individuals’ homophily levels, and referral hiring. An agent-based simulation model was d...

During the last decade, scheduling the healthcare services (such as staffs and OTs) inside the hospitals have assumed a central role in healthcare. Recently, some works are addressed in the direction of hiring the expert consultants (mainly doctors) for the critical healthcare scenarios from outside of the medical unit, in both strategic and non-strategic settings under monetary and non-monetar...

Research on employers’ hiring discrimination is limited by the unlawfulness of such activity. Consequently, researchers have focused on the intention to hire. Instead, we rely on a virtual labour market, the Fantasy Football Premier League, where employers can freely exercise their taste for racial discrimination in terms of hiring and firing. The setting allows us to eliminate co-worker, consu...

I propose a model of bargaining between workers and large firms that resembles the Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b) model, but has the desirable feature that workers and firms behave in a privately efficient manner. I assume that on hiring, firms and workers can contract to behave efficiently in the future, while maintaining the assumption that the marginal surplus associated with the match is split...

We use matched employee-employer records from the teacher labor market to explore the effects of late teacher hiring on student achievement. Hiring teachers after the school year starts reduces student achievement by 0.042SD in mathematics and 0.026SD in reading. This reflects, in part, a temporary disruption effect in the first year. In mathematics, but not in reading, late-hired teachers rema...