The n-player Hotelling game calls for each player to choose a point on the line segment, so as to maximize the size of his Voronoi cell. This paper studies fault-tolerant versions of the Hotelling game. Two fault models are studied: line faults and player faults. The first model assumes that the environment is prone to failure: with some probability, a disconnection occurs at a random point on ...

This paper re-examines the Hotelling model of optimal nonrenewable resource extraction in light of stock effects and technological progress. We assume functional forms for cost and demand so that the solution to the Hotelling problem is a steady-state consistent with the empirical observation that the growth rates of market prices have remained zero over a long period of time. We use data on 14...

Step-down testing procedures for the Hotelling T2 problem are considered. We show that the step-down procedure proposed by S.N. Roy, R.E. Bargmann, and J. Roy is inadmissibleamonginvariantprocedures (for a suitable invariance group) in many situatiqns, includiItgallthosefor which more than two steps are contemplated. We also show that in most cases, the power of the step-down procedure decrease...

In this paper we expand the standard Hotelling-Downs model (Hotelling 1929; Downs 1957) of spatial competition to a setting where clients do not necessarily choose their closest candidate (retail product or political). Specifically, we consider a setting where clients may disavow all candidates if there is no candidate that is sufficiently close to the client preferences. Moreover, if there are...

In this paper a novel method is proposed for construction of an exponential observer for nonlinear system. The presented method is based on direct solution of dynamic error without any linearzing of nonlinear terms. Necessary and sufficient conditions for construction of direct observer are presented. Stability of the observer is checked using Lyapunov theorem. Also the ability of this observer...

The present paper reviews the literature on the empirical implications of the Hotelling rule and suggests directions for further research in this area.

We investigate a mixed duopoly market where a welfare−maximizing public firm competes against a profit−maximizing private firm, using a linear−city location−then−price model with linear transportation costs. We find that, compared with the results in the purely private duopoly case discussed by Hotelling (1929) and d' Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979), the condition under which price equ...