We propose a simple bargaining procedure, the equilibrium of which converges to the Walrasian allocation as the agents become increasingly patient. We thus establish that the competitive outcome obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other bargaining protocols the final outcome depends on bargaining power or relative impatience, the outcome here is...

The aim of this paper is to determine how the place of a player in a network of communications ̊ affects her bargaining power with respect to the others. We adapt the Rubinstein-Stahl two-player noncooperative bargaining game of alternating offers to the case of n players connected through a graph. We show that this game has a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome from which we d...

I use the health care industry as a novel laboratory in which to study a firm’s strategic use of debt to enhance their bargaining power during negotiations with non-financial stakeholders. I show that reimbursement rates negotiated between a hospital and insurers for a specific procedure are higher when the hospital has more debt. I also show that this effect is stronger when hospitals have les...

Most studies that explore collective models of intra-household decision-making use economic outcomes such as human capital, earnings, assets, and relative income shares proxies the distribution bargaining power. These studies, however, fail to incorporate important measures control over management resources within households. In current study, a direct measure financial power household is used ...

Experiments with the ultimatum game—where one party can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a second party on how to split a pie—illustrate that conventional game theory has been wrong in its predictions regarding the simplest of bargaining settings: Even when one party has enormous bargaining power, she may be able to extract all the surplus from trade, because the second party will reject gro...

This article investigates reasons why children who were considered at risk of HIV were not taken for HIV testing by their caregivers. Qualitative and quantitative data collected in Zambia from 2010-11 revealed that twelve percent of caregivers who stated that they had been suspecting an HIV infection in a child in their custody had not had the child tested. Fears of negative reactions from the ...

We estimate a collective time allocation model, where Dutch, Surinamese/Antillean and Turkish households behave as if both spouses maximize a household utility function. We assume that paid labor and housework are the endogenous choice variables and furthermore consider household production. Surinamese/Antillean and Turkish women differ from Dutch women because they value (joint) household prod...

Child height is a significant predictor of human capital and economic status throughout adulthood. Moreover, non-unitary household models family behavior posit that an increase in women’s bargaining power can influence child health. We study the effects inheritance law change, Hindu Succession Act Amendment (HSAA), which conferred enhanced rights to unmarried women India, on height. find robust...