It is nearly 10 years since Patrick Haggard and colleagues first reported the 'intentional binding' effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). The intentional binding effect refers to the subjective compression of the temporal interval between a voluntary action and its external sensory consequence. Since the first report, considerable interest has been generated and a fascinating array of stu...

In cognitive neuroscience the sense of agency is defined as the as the experience of controlling one’s own actions and, through this control, affecting the external world. At CHI 2012 I presented a paper entitled “I did that! Measuring Users’ Experience of Agency in their own Actions” [1]. This extended abstract draws heavily on that paper, which described an implicit measure called intentional...

ver a decade ago, when I was chief scientist at the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, I spoke at a conference called Women and Science: Celebrating Achievements, Charting Challenges. I lauded women working in astrophysics, government, and science policy in the United States and elsewhere, but said that progress was mixed—the veneer of success for women across the sciences, and...

This paper analyzes communication with a language that is vague in the sense that identical messages do not always result in identical interpretations. It is shown that strategic agents frequently add to this vagueness by being intentionally vague, i.e. they deliberately choose less precise messages than they have to among the ones available to them in equilibrium. Having to communicate with a ...

Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This paper offers an account of the kind of intentional state phenomenal states are: they are underived intentional states. This account of phenomenal states is equivalent to two theses: first, all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states; second, all possible underived intentional sta...