We prove that when the number of (potential) buyers is at least three, every ex post equilibrium in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves combinatorial auction mechanisms is a bundling equilibrium and is symmetric. This complements a theorem proved in Holzman, Kfir-Dahav, Monderer, and Tennenholtz [6], according to which, the symmetric bundling equilibria are precisely those defined by a quasi field.

* In the three linked articles Drs Clarke, Chambers, and Milne deal with the issue of using readmission rates as an outcome indicatorfor hospital care. Thefirst paper assesses thefeasibility ofmeasuring readmission ratesfrom routinely collected Korner data in a study of three districts in North East Thames region and the second, based on a study in one district, whether readmissions may be judg...

In the customary VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism truth-telling is a dominant strategy. In this paper we study the sequential VCG mechanism and show that other dominant strategies may then exist. We illustrate how this fact can be used to minimize taxes using examples concerned with Clarke tax and public projects.

In this paper, we establish a new analogue of the classical Bonferroni inequalities and their improvements by Galambos for sums of type ∑ π∈P(U)(−1)(|π| − 1)!f(π) where U is a finite set, P(U) is the partition lattice of U and f : P(U) → R is some suitable non-negative function. Applications of this new analogue are given to counting connected k-uniform hypergraphs, network reliability, and cum...