Millions of Muslims across the Indian Ocean littoral have been following matrilineal systems for several centuries. Both in past and present, Minangkabau Indonesia, Negeri Sem...

We study the question of institutional choice—auctions or negotiations?—in a particular industry: the American cattle market. We consider the possibility that collusion in auctions is driving cattle producers away from auctions and towards negotiations. We provide a model that captures many key features of the industry and lays the groundwork for future work that could encapsulate many other fa...

We continue our study of negotations, a concurrency model with multiparty negotiation as primitive. In a previous paper [7] we have provided a correct and complete set of reduction rules for sound, acyclic, and (weakly) deterministic negotiations. In this paper we extend this result to all deterministic negotiations, including cyclic ones. We also show that this set of rules allows one to decid...

Policy-based dynamic negotiations allow more flexible authorization in complex Grid environments, and relieve both users and administrators from up front negotiations and registrations. This paper describes how such negotiations overcome current Grid authorization limitations, and how policy-based negotiation mechanisms can be easily integrated into a Grid infrastructure. Such an extension prov...

Business negotiations represent a form of communication where informativeness, i.e., the amount of provided information, depends on context and situation. In this study, we hypothesize that relations exist between language signals of informativeness and the success or failure of negotiations. We support our hypothesis through linguistic and statistical analysis which acquires language patterns ...

We use the experimental method to compare second-price auctions to “verifiable” multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer it currently holds. We find that transaction prices are lower in verifiable multilateral negotiations than in second-price auctions, despite the two institutions’ seeming equivalence. The difference occurs because l...