What Buys Happiness? Analyzing Trends in Subjective Well-Being in 15 European Countries, 1973-2002 Trends in life satisfaction are examined across 15 European countries employing a modified version of Kendall’s Tau. Analyses show that GDP growth relative to growth in the preceding period is a significant determinant of the trends; the same holds for the growth in life expectancy while the conte...

The 1990 Coastal Zone Reauthorization Amendments (CZARA), a portion of the Clean Water Act, federally mandated coastal states to adopt management measures to regulate non-point source (NPS) pollution. Coastal states adopted management plans between 1997 and 2002, and regulated areas bordering coasts but not other areas of the state. Despite financial outlays, no work examines whether the legisl...

In recent years, aiming to reduce the Greenhouse Gas pollution and promote energy efficiency and conservation among consumers’ energy use, price policies and price changes derived from environmental regulations have played a more important role. In this paper, using the most recent annual state-level panel data for 48 states, I estimate a dynamic partial adjustment model for electricity demand ...

Political parties can be vehicles for economic and social development in poor countries. They can also serve as rent seeking instruments. Uncovering how parties function is therefore key to establishing the preconditions for good governance. The paper discusses when and why clientelism on the basis of party affiliation may arise. Operationally, party-based clientelism is defined as a bias of pu...

I present a theory of optimal multilateral trade agreements with public political shocks. I show that “forbearance” where one country withholds retaliation when its trading partner receives a shock is a feature of an optimal agreement. This provides a rationale for countries not acting on retaliatory rights granted under GATT. I show that there is a limit to forbearance allowable in a self-enfo...

This paper argues that politicians are overprotected. The costs of political assassination differ systematically depending on whether a private or a public point of view is taken. A politician attributes a very high (if not infinite) cost to his or her survival. The social cost of political assassination is much smaller as politicians are replaceable. Conversely, the private cost of the securit...

Elements of an economic theory of political institutions are introduced. A variety of electoral systems are reviewed. Cox’s threshold is shown to measure incentives for diversity and specialization of candidates’ positions, when the number of serious candidates is given. Duverger’s law and its generalizations are discussed, to predict the number of serious candidates. Duverger’s law is interpre...

We study the relationship between the political connections of Chinese firms and workplace fatalities. The worker death rate for connected companies is five times that of unconnected firms; this result also holds when we exploit executive turnover to generate within-firm estimates. The connections-mortality relationship is attenuated in provinces where officials’ promotion is contingent on meet...

Income Inequality, Mobility, and the Welfare State: A Political Economy Model In this paper, we set up a three-period stochastic overlapping generations model to analyze the implications of income inequality and mobility for demand for redistribution and social insurance. We model the size of two different public programs under the welfare state. We investigate bidimensional voting on the tax r...

We study how the proximity of elections affects policy choices in a model in which policymakers want to improve their reputation to increase their reelection chances. Policymakers’ equilibrium decisions depend on both their reputation and the proximity of the next election. Typically, incentives to influence election results are stronger closer to the election (for a given reputation level), as...