Principal-agent theory encapsulates a tradition of rational choice modeling, in which some actor(s) (the principal(s)) uses whatever actions are available, to provide incentives for some other actor(s) (the agent(s)) to make decisions that the principal most prefers. Because principal-agent theory focuses on the responsiveness of the agents decisions to the principal’s goals, and how this respo...

aim of the present research was to design a proper model for management of knowledge in environmental organizations of country. in study of the model, suitability of the proposed model was researched by asking views of directors, deputies, managers of groups and scientific board members of environmental organizations of country. for this purpose, with review of research literature, insight pro...

This paper studies a principal–agent relation in which the principal’s private information about the agent’s effort choice is more accurate than a noisy public performance measure. For some contingencies the optimal contract has to specify ex post inefficiencies in the form of inefficient termination (firing the agent) or third–party payments (money burning). We show that money burning is the l...

This paper studies the optimal design of sickness benefits in a repeated principal–agent model, where fraudsters are not observed by principal. Sickness compensation protects workers against income fluctuations implied risk illness and its provision is limited presence using this protection to temporarily adjust their labour supply. We show that slope contract depends on dynamics rate over time...