IN THIS PAPER WE SEARCH for solutions to various classes of allocation problems. We Ž require them to be Pareto efficient and indi idually rational in the sense that no agent is . ever worse off than he would be on his own . In addition to these minimal requirements we also would like agents not to be able to profitably misrepresent their preferences. This property is known as strategy-proofnes...

It is shown that simple and coalitional strategy-proofness of a voting rule on the full unimodal domain of a convex idempotent interval space (X, I) are equivalent properties if (X, I) satisfies interval anti-exchange, a basic property also shared by a large class of convex geometries including -but not reducing totrees and linear geometries. Therefore, strategy-proof location problems in a vas...

We consider the problem of coordinating the exchange of real-time information among multiple agents. For example, a US Department of Transportation pilot program seeks to reduce tra c accidents by allowing each vehicle to request and send crash-relevant information (e.g. position, speed, braking status) from and to neighboring vehicles. Time is of the essence: vehicle information becomes stale ...

We show that, when the number of participating agents n tends to infinity, all classical social choice rules are asymptotically strategy-proof with the proportion of manipulable profiles being of order O (1/ √ n). Running title: On asymptotic strategy-proofness.

auctions have been as a competitive method of buying and selling valuable or rare items for a long time. single-sided auctions in which participants negotiate on a single attribute (e.g. price) are very popular. double auctions and negotiation on multiple attributes create more advantages compared to single-sided and single-attribute auctions. nonetheless, this adds the complexity of the auctio...

We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set agents with strict preferences. show that there exists no mechanism which is unanimous, strategy-proof and envy-free. Weakening first requirement to q-unanimity – i.e., when every agent ranks different object at top, then each shall receive his most-preferred probability least q we satisfying strategy-proofness, envy-freeness ex-...

In a production economy where a single private good is produced via a non-linear concave technology, no direct mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness and efficiency if the preference domain contains the class of linear preferences.

This appendix contains supplementary theoretical and empirical results (including discussions of critical networks, asymmetric payoffs, robustness and an alternative definition of renegotiation-proofness) that accompany the paper “Social Capital and Social Quilts: Network Patterns of Favor Exchange.”