What makes e-money special relative to cash? How does the introduction of electronic money improve the functioning of a payment system, in which cash is used as an incumbent payment instrument? This paper adopts a mechanism design approach to identify the essential features of e-money that improve the effi ciency of the economy. We build a micro-founded general equilibrium model to compare the ...

This paper brings together analyses of two-way flow Strict Nash networks under exclusive player heterogeneity assumption and exclusive partner heterogeneity assumption. This is achieved through examining how the interactions between these two assumptions influence important properties of Strict Nash networks. Built upon the findings of Billand et al (2011) and Galleotti et al (2006), which assu...

This paper studies the interplay of capital resources in a small open economy by way of a general equilibrium political economy model. Normative implications for human capital migration resulting from physical capital lobbying are analyzed. Findings reveal that lobbying designed to mitigate the capital levy problem leads to increased human capital migration and that optimal tax policy for a soc...

In many economic situations, a player pursues coordination or anti-coordination with her neighbors on a network, but she also has intrinsic preferences among the available options. We here introduce a model which allows to analyze this issue by means of a simple framework in which players endowed with an idiosyncratic identity interact on a social network through strategic complements or substi...

We consider an OLG model (of a socialization process) where continuous traits are transmitted from an adult generation to the children. A weighted social network describes how children are influenced not only by their parents but also by other role models within the society. Parents can invest into the purposeful socialization of their children by strategically displaying a cultural trait (whic...

We develop a de nition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The de nition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto eÆcient voting rule is uniquely determined, and in fact coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas. Under voting by successive elimination (or amendment), the set of equ...

We consider social learning settings in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state of the world, observe private signals, share the same utility function, and act in a general dynamic setting. We introduce Social Learning Equilibria, a static equilibrium concept that abstracts away from the details of the given dynamics, but nevertheless captures the corresponding asymptotic equ...

We develop an analytical core for sociology. We follow standard dynamical systems theory by first specifying the conditions for social equilibrium, and then studying the dynamical principles that govern disequilibrium behavior. Our general social equilibrium model is an expansion of the general equilibrium model of economic theory, and our dynamical principles treat the society as a complex ada...

This paper is a comparative study of game-theoretic solution concepts in strictly competitive multiagent scenarios, as commonly encountered in the context of parlor games, competitive economic situations, and some social choice settings. We model these scenarios as ranking games in which every outcome is a ranking of the players, with higher ranks being preferred over lower ones. Rather than co...

Abstract In a strategic-form game, strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger notions can be defined by considering various restrictions on formation. For instance, in Nash equilibrium, it assumed that coalitions are singletons, and super strong every viable. Restricti...