This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game asymmetric noisy observation. In our model, the follower cannot observe state process directly, but could observation process, while leader can completely process. Open-loop equilibrium considered. The first solve optimal control problem partial observation, maximum principle and verification theorem are obtained. Then turn...

The fastest known algorithm for solving General Bayesian Stackelberg games with a finite set of follower (adversary) types have seen direct practical use at the LAX airport for over 3 years; and currently, an (albeit non-Bayesian) algorithm for solving these games is also being used for scheduling air marshals on limited sectors of international flights by the US Federal Air Marshals Service. T...

To dissuade reckless driving and mitigate accidents, cities deploy resources to patrol roads. In this paper, we present STREETS, an application developed for the city of Singapore, which models the problem of computing randomized traffic patrol strategies as a defenderattacker Stackelberg game. Previous work on Stackelberg security games has focused extensively on counterterrorism settings. STR...

Stackelberg-like games show a situation where there is a clear advantage in moving …rst. In a thought provoking article, Bagwell (1995) shows that this advantage may not be robust against imperfect observations of the …rst move. We explore these ideas in the context of forward induction in three classic games, namely, the outside option game, the game of burning a dollar before the battle of th...

The challenge of self-optimization for orthogonal frequency-division multiple-access (OFDMA) interference channels is that users inherently compete harmfully and simultaneous water-filling (WF) would lead to a Pareto-inefficient equilibrium. To overcome this, we first introduce the role of environmental interference derivative in the WF optimization of the interactive OFDMA game and then study ...

We investigate advertising level, pricing and production decision problems in a supply chain when demand and cost disruptions occur simultaneously. The channel consists of one manufacturer and one retailer where demand depends on retail price and advertisement expenditure. We examine the case in both cooperative game and non-cooperative Stackelberg game.

Recently, there has been significant research interest in using game-theoretic approaches to allocate limited security resources to protect physical infrastructure including ports, airports, transit systems, and other critical national infrastructure as well as natural resources such as forests, tigers, fish, and so on. Indeed, the leader-follower Stackelberg game model is at the heart of many ...

There has been significant recent research interest in utilizing leaderfollower Stackelberg game in security applications. Indeed, Stackelberg games are seen at many deployed applications [6]: ARMOR at Los Angeles International Airport, IRIS for Federal Air Marshals Service, GUARDS for the Transportation Security Administration, and TRUSTS for the Los Angeles Metro Rail System [3] (under evalua...

Environmental regulators often use environmental policy to induce green investment by firms. However, if an environmental policy fails to exert a long-run effect on regulating the economic agents' behavior, it may be more reasonable to think of the firm as the leader in the game, since the investment in green technology is usually a strategic decision. In this paper, we consider a three-stage S...

We investigate a game in which there is a long-run player who has private information about how long will the game last, who must precommit to an action, and who faces a sequence of short-run players who get a noisy signal of that action. We might expect such a long-lived long-run player to behave as a Stackelberg leader since most short-run players will eventually learn the true action. Howeve...