Article history: Accepted 17 September 2013 JEL classifications: L13 L15

Article history: Received 8 February 2009 Received in revised form 6 May 2009 Accepted 14 May 2009 Available online 23 June 2009 JEL classificaitons: D6 L5 L96

This paper analyzes price elasticities in the Austrian market for mobile telecommunications services using data on firm specific tariffs. Both static and a dynamic panel data approaches lead to consistent results which provide evidence for a relatively elastic demand. Furthermore, some basic facts on the Austrian mobile telephone sector are presented. JEL-Classification: C23, L13, L96.

Auctions have emerged as the primary means of assigning spectrum licenses to companies wishing to provide wireless communication services. Since July 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted 33 spectrum auctions, assigning thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Countries throughout the world are conducting similar auctions. I review the current state of spectrum auct...

Digitization has led to many new creative products, straining the capacity of professional critics and consumers. Yet, digitization retailing also delivered crowd-based sources pre-purchase information. We compare relative impacts Amazon star ratings on consumer welfare in book publishing. Using various fixed effects discontinuity-based empirical strategies, we estimate their causal sales. use ...

The optimal design of input prices is analyzed in a simple setting where the regulator has limited knowledge of efficient production costs. Under some conditions, input prices are optimally set equal to expected efficient production costs, as under the Federal Communications Commission’s TELRIC pricing policy in the U.S. telecommunications industry. More generally, input prices optimally reflec...

Market design plays an essential role in promoting innovation. I examine emission allowance auctions, airport slot auctions, spectrum auctions, and electricity markets, and demonstrate how the market design can encourage innovation. Improved pricing information is one source of innovation. Enhancing competition is another driver of innovation seen in all of the applications. Market design foste...

We study a major new entry in the French mobile telecommunications market, followed by introduction of fighting brands three incumbents. Using an empirical oligopoly model, we find that incumbents’ brand strategies are difficult to rationalize as unilateral best responses. Instead, their consistent with breakdown tacit semi-collusion: before entry, incumbents could successfully coordinate on re...

Fraud is an ancient crime and one that annually causes hundreds of billions of dollars in losses. We examine the behavioral patterns over time of different types of frauds, which illustrate cyclical frequencies. We develop an evolutionary theory that suggests cyclic behavior in frauds should be common. JEL classifications: D92, L15, P17

Standard pricing theories consider consumers without temptation. With temptation and costly self-control, consumers dislike choice sets with tempting alternatives. We study firms’ strategy against such consumers, using Gul–Pesendorfer preferences and a game where firms compete by offering menus. JEL Classification: D43, L13, L15