We study feasible sets of the bargaining problem under two different assumptions: the players are subjective expected utility maximizers or the players are Choquet expected utility maximizers. For the latter case, we consider the effects on bargaining solutions when players become more risk averse and when they become more uncertainty averse. JEL Classification: C78, D81

This paper develops an axiomatic theory of decision making under uncertainty that dispenses with the state space. The results are subjective expected utility models with unique, action-dependent, subjective probabilities, and a utility function defined over wealth-effect pairs that is unique up to positive linear transformation. JEL classification code: D81

This paper provides preference foundations for parametric weighting functions under rank-dependent utility. This is achieved by decomposing the independence axiom of expected utility into separate meaningful properties. These conditions allow us to characterize rank-dependent utility with power and exponential weighting functions. Moreover, by allowing probabilistic risk attitudes to vary withi...

This paper characterizes properties of chance attitudes (nonadditive measures). It does so for decision under uncertainty (unknown probabilities), where it assumes Choquet expected utility, and for decision under risk (known probabilities), where it assumes rank-dependent utility. It analyzes chance attitude independently from utility. All preference conditions concern simple violations of the ...

We provide a necessary and a sufficient condition on an individual’s expected utility function under which any zero-mean idiosyncratic risk increases cautiousness (the derivative of the reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion), which is the key determinant for this individual’s demand for options and portfolio insurance. JEL Classification Codes: D51, D58, D81, G11, G12, G13.

Machina (2009, 2012) lists a number of situations where standard models of ambiguity aversion are unable to capture plausible features of ambiguity attitudes. Most of these problems arise in choice over prospects involving three or more outcomes. We show that the recursive non-expected utility model of Segal (1987) is rich enough to accommodate all these situations. JEL Classification number: D81

We develop a behavioral axiomatic characterization of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) under risk aversion. Given is an individual agent’s behavior in the market: assume a finite collection of asset purchases with corresponding prices. We show that such behavior satisfies a “revealed preference axiom” if and only if there exists a SEU model (a subjective probability over states and a concave u...

We compare the rationality of choice under risk – utility maximization, stochastic dominance, and expected-utility maximization – of students from one of the best universities in the US and one of the best universities in Africa. The US subjects came nearer to consistency with utility maximization and the dominance principle, but there are no differences between the two samples in consistency w...

The concept of linear risk tolerance is transferred from the expected utility framework to the two-parameter, mean-variance approach. We show how the requirement of a hyperbolical Arrow-Pratt index translates from the EU-approach into a condition on the marginal rate of substitution between return and risk in the two-parameter approach. As a spin-off from this translation, we derive a specific ...

Classical foundations of expected utility were provided by Ramsey, de Finetti, von Neumann and Morgenstern, Anscombe and Aumann, and others. These foundations describe preference conditions to capture the empirical content of expected utility. The assumed preference conditions, however, vary among the models and a unifying idea is not readily transparent. Providing such a unifying idea is the p...