This article aims to study lease and hiring contract in the Iranian-Islamic setting and analyze the asymmetric information problem in these contracts. For doing this, we study the characteristics of lease and hiring contracts in Iran (real world experimental characteristics that recognized in other studies), using library method, then we mathematically model different aspects of asymmetric info...

If the costs and benefits of discriminating at the hiring stage differ from those at the retention and promotion stages, as recent evidence suggests, the effect of an individual’s race on a firm’s hiring decision should differ from its effect on the firm’s retention and promotion decisions. This paper presents the first direct empirical test of this proposition. Using data of players drafted in...

We estimate a model of labour demand that accounts for dynamics arising from the relative costs of hiring and "ring workers on either inde"nite-term contract (ITC) or "xed-term contract (FTC). We use a panel of 1000 French "rms, for which we can measure the number of entries and exits for each type of contract between 1988 and 1992. Our estimates suggest that (1) it is much more costly to lay o...

Fixed-term contract employment has increasingly replaced regular open-ended employment as the predominant form of employment notably in developing countries. Guided by factory-level evidence showing nuanced patterns of co-movements of regular and contract wages, we propose a two-tiered task based model with self-enforcing contracts in which firms allocate complex tasks to long term employees at...

We present a theoretical explanation for the intuitive proposition that the occupational safety conditions of on-site contract workers (employees of contracting firms) and employees (employees of host companies) are likely to differ. We derive ordinary imperfect information models from a review of regulations governing Japan’s nuclear utility industry. The models imply that hiring contract work...

On the example of Lebanon, features functioning system hiring foreign workers (kafala) in Arab countries are considered. In this applies to domestic workers, especially women. However, employers often do not fulfill their obligations under contract. addition, economic crisis that broke out country made its own adjustments.

Buyers and sellers of dental practices have much to lose by not hiring an attorney who specializes in dental practice transitions for the sale. Such an attorney can (1) protect the dentist with language that should be (but isn't) in the contract; (2) help address any organizational, regulatory and tax issues that arise; and (3) provide far more thorough services than could nonspecializing attor...

Following extensive empirical evidence about “market anomalies” and overconfidence, the analysis of financial markets with agents overconfident about the precision of their private information has received a lot of attention. However, all these models consider agents trading for their own account. In this article, we analyse a standard delegated portfolio management problem between a financial ...

We study how flexibility in workforce capacity can be used to efficiently match capacity and demand. Flexibility in workforce capacity is introduced by the annualized hours regime. Annualized hours allow organizations to measure working time per year, instead of per month or per week. An additional source of flexibility is hiring employees with different contract types, like full-time, part-tim...

We study incentive design in an agency setting when monitoring is costly, and this cost is endogenously determined by the contract structure. A firm employs multiple workers to obtain costly unverifiable information about an unknown state (a task) and report it to the firm. The firm uses peer-monitoring to incentivize workers by hiring multiple workers and conditioning payment upon how a worker...