This paper analyzes the connection between informal insurance institutions in rural Africa and the adoption of new technologies. We model two linked games — a community risk-sharing game and an old-age insurance game — and analyze the multiple equilibria that arise. We provide a numerical example that indicates that informal insurance institutions may put a downward pressure on the adoption of ...

The realization that mere existence of health care facilities does not necessarily mean that they are readily accessible to the poorest section in the informal economy, tend to the evolution of a unique health insurance scheme, with contribution according to individual capacity. This paper examines several health insurance schemes catering to the informal sector as well as some critical issues ...

We compare capital requirements derived by tail conditional expectation (TCE) with those derived by tail conditional median (TCM) and find that there is no clear-cut relationship between these two measures in empirical data. Our results highlight the relevance of TCM as a robust alternative to TCE, especially for regulatory control. JEL Classification: G10, G11, G23, G29

This paper analyses whether agricultural information flows give rise to social learning effects in banana cultivation in Nyakatoke, a small Tanzanian village. Based on a village census, full information is available on socio-economic characteristics and banana production of farmer kinship members, neighbours and informal insurance group members. This allows a test for social learning within the...

T his study aims to demonstrate that joining in risk sharing network leads to the reduction in incomes volatility. In this respect, income variance for a group of members in an informal insurance is modelled in which income variance prior to joining risk sharing network and after joining is analyzed statistically. A Monte Carlo simulation technique is used to prove the result. To extend an...

For a dynamic limit order market, we present a Markov perfect equilibrium with Edgeworth cycles. In equilibrium, when sellers enter the market consecutively, the best quote decreases tick by tick, then jumps more than one tick, creating a hole in the book. The next quote rebounds to the less aggressive level, and the same cycle starts over again. Holes can relate to the high kurtosis of transac...

This paper examines the relationship between the board structure of UK firms and the accuracy of individual analysts’ earnings forecasts with respect to information asymmetry and agency theory. We hypothesize that managers of firms complying with the recommendations of The Code of Best Practice may have “less to hide” and, subsequently, provide more information to outsiders (including analysts)...

This paper uses a simple model of mean-variance capital markets equilibrium with proportional transactions costs to analyze the competition of stock markets for investors. We assume that equity trading is costly and endogenize transactions costs as variables strategically influenced by stock exchanges. Among other things, the model predicts that increasing financial market correlation leads to ...

The aim of this paper is to understand the impact of optimal provision of both risk and incentives on the choice of contracting partners. I study a risky setting where heterogeneously risk-averse employers and employees must match to be productive. They face a standard onesided moral hazard problem: mean output increases in the noncontractible input of the employee. Better insurance comes at th...

We investigate the dynamic general equilibrium effects of introducing a social assistance program to elderly informal sector workers in developing countries. We find that the extension of such “retirement benefits” in environments with lacking private sector risksharing mechanisms results in welfare increases and relatively minor efficiency losses. Our results suggest that welfare gains attribu...