Online auctions have become an increasingly important aspect of e-commerce. However, for consumers, the chances of landing a winning bid in online auctions has become increasingly more difficult with the abundance of “bidding robots”. Bidding robots such as “BidRobot” and “Auction Sniper” are pieces of software that are configured by the user to follow any number of auctions on different auctio...

Unique-Bid auction sites are gaining popularity on the Internet in recent years. We have managed to extract dynamic temporal bidding data from such a site, using a backpropagation algorithm for analysis of side signals. This offered us rare insights on actual bidding strategies used by actual bidders, such as bidding-bursts, late-bidding and position-targeted bidding. We constructed an agent-ba...

The auction method developed by Bertsekas in the late 1970s is a relaxation technique for solving integer-valued assignment problems. It resembles a competitive bidding process, where unsatisfied persons (bidders) attempt to claim the objects (lots) offering the best value. By transforming integer-valued transport problems into assignment problems, the auction method can be extended to compute ...

In electronic markets, seller information is often obscured or unavailable, which current theories of reputation and opportunism contend will motivate opportunistic behavior. We investigate how reputable and opportunistic behaviors are motivated in online auctions. This exploratory study examines irregular bidding, which occurs when a bidder makes a bid for an item in an auction, yet that bidde...

This paper shows that in online auctions like eBay, if bidders can only place bids at random times, then many different equilibria arise besides truthful bidding, despite the option to leave proxy bids. These equilibria can involve gradual bidding, periods of inactivity, and waiting to start bidding towards the end of the auction bidding behaviors common on eBay. Bidders in such equilibria impl...

In an all-pay auction, only one bidder wins but all bidders must pay the auctioneer. All-pay bidding games arise from attaching a similar bidding structure to traditional combinatorial games to determine which player moves next. In contrast to the established theory of single-pay bidding games, optimal play involves choosing bids from some probability distribution that will guarantee a minimum ...

This paper analyzes auctions where budget-constrained bidders have options to declare bankruptcy. It predicts a bidding equilibrium that changes discontinuously in a borrowing rate available to bidders. When the borrowing rate is above a threshold, high-budget bidders win, and the likelihood of bankruptcy is low. When the borrowing rate is below the threshold, the winner is the most budget-cons...

Aggregating the Demand Response (DR) is approved as an effective solution to improve the participation of consumers to wholesale electricity markets. DR aggregator can negotiate the amount of collected DR of their customers with transmission system operator, distributors, and retailers in Demand Response eXchange (DRX) market, in addition to participate in the energy market. In this paper, a fr...

In e-commerce, Business-to-Business (B2B) interactions, like e.g., electronic negotiations and auctions between suppliers and customers, could be significantly improved by enabling their participants to adapt their negotiation and bidding strategies to current logistics information (e.g., about estimated transportation cost) while the interaction goes on. In this paper, we present an agent-base...

Due to the limited predictability and associated uncertainty of renewable energy resources, renewable-based electricity systems are confronted with instability problems. In such power systems, implementation of Demand Response (DR) programs not only can improve the system stability but also enhances market efficiency and system reliability. By implementing cloud-based engineering systems the ut...