نتایج جستجو برای: ceo compensation
تعداد نتایج: 46349 فیلتر نتایج به سال:
Motivated by concerns that stock-based compensation might lead to excessive risk-taking, this paper examines the relations between CEO incentives and the cost of debt. Unlike prior research, this paper uses the sensitivities of CEO stock and option portfolios to stock price (delta) and stock return volatility (vega) to measure CEO incentives. Higher delta (vega) is predicted to be related to le...
This paper investigates the compensation usefulness of accounting variables along several important dimensions (accruals-based vs. cash-flows based, non-return vs. return, and gross vs. net measures), as well as the time series variation of performance measures in CEO bonus plans, using a unique panel of manually collected CEO bonus determinants spanning fiscal years 2006 to 2011. We document t...
The overall independence of a firm’s governance system depends not only on the independence of its board of directors but also on CEO influence over the other top executives. We find that board independence and independence from CEO influence in the executive suite are inversely related. Difference-in-difference estimates using a regulatory shock reveal that strengthening board independence wea...
We use a bargaining framework to examine empirically the relations between director compensation and board-of-director independence. Our evidence suggests that independent directors have a bargaining advantage over the CEO that results in compensation more closely aligned with shareholders’ objectives. Firms with more outsiders on their boards award directors more equity-based compensation. Whe...
Prior research has investigated the association between executive equity compensation and earnings management but the evidence is not conclusive. We investigate this question using the quantile regression approach which allows the coefficient on the independent variable (equity compensation) to shift across the distribution of the dependent variable (earnings management). Based on a sample of 1...
We examine the interaction between risk (uncertainty) and production efficiency in determining pay-performance sensitivity in optimal executive compensation. Particularly, we show that the risk-incentive trade-off is exacerbated (attenuated) as production efficiency increases when the efficiency level is greater (less) than the level of compensation risk. This result suggests that the optimalit...
Purpose:This study examines the moderating impact of corporate governance quality on relation between CEO bonus compensation and accounting conservatism.
Abstract. We model costly interactions (contracts) between managers and investors. We suggest that globalization of production and favorable technology shock of the 1990s altered economic environment of managerinvestor interactions. These changes exacerbate agency conflict due to the increased managerial gains from ex post reneging, and, simultaneously, decreased costs of managerial reneging. I...
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