CEO compensation has increased dramatically in the last few decades, drawing increasing scrutiny from policy-makers, researchers, and the broader public. We find that IT (information technology) intensity strongly predicts compensation of CEO and other top executives. Our examination of panel data from 2507 publicly traded firms over 15 years controls for other types of capital, number of emplo...

The CEO’s control over information in the boardroom limits the board’s ability to monitor the CEO. We examine how CEOs’ incentives to hide negative information from the board depend on their compensation structure, and how the board can structure CEO compensation optimally to mitigate the problem. The optimal compensation package consists of options and severance pay. Option pay forces the CEO ...

This paper investigates the role of non-financial performance measures in executive compensation. Using a sample of Internet firms we document that web traffic, an important nonfinancial measure for firms in the Internet industry, is positively associated with CEO total compensation and total change in CEO wealth. This association is robust to controlling for traditional financial performance m...

This paper investigates the role of non-financial performance measures in executive compensation. Using a sample of Internet firms we document that web traffic, an important nonfinancial measure for firms in the Internet industry, is positively associated with CEO total compensation and total change in CEO wealth. This association is robust to controlling for traditional financial performance m...

We examine the effect of compensation consultants on CEO pay. Using a sample of 292 firms in 2006 randomly selected from ExecuComp, we find that compensation consultants are associated with higher salaries, consistent with the hypothesis that consultants help boards of directors justify excessive CEO pay. However, we also find that the use of a consultant is associated with lower bonuses and to...

Compensation of bank CEOs increases after mergers, suggesting that executives may engage in acquisitions to enjoy size-related personal benefits (Bliss and Rosen, 2001). Alternatively, bank mergers can be viewed as the efficient assignation of merged assets to the managerial team best suited to realize merger gains. Theories of executive compensation based on managerial productivity and optimal...

Abstract The primary purpose of this study is to explore the determinants CEO bonus compensation: examine bonuses and whether or not independent variables are associated with compensation. For purposes study, a sample 2,448 compensations across 1,622 firms from 1997 2002 was used test several hypotheses. dependent variable in model Bonus dollar value (cash non-cash) earned by named executive of...