Acknowledgements: We appreciate the valuable research assistance of Tamara Rhynehardt and Lynn McNeil. More than 30 years ago, Armen Alchian (1969) posited that replacement of an inefficient division head would be " quicker " within a conglomerate firm than if the division were a standalone firm. He ended his discussion of the issue with " But what the truth is, I do not know. " Despite the con...

Empirical evidence is scarce on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in U.S. hospitals, with potentially serious implications for many of these organizations. This study, based on a nationwide survey of CEOs at non-federal general surgical and medical community hospitals conducted in the spring of 2004, reports the perceptions of hospital CEOs regarding the circumstances and impact of CEO tur...

Article history: Received 17 September 2013 Received in revised form 1 March 2014 Accepted 11 March 2014 Available online 19 March 2014 Most studies consider chief executive officer (CEO) turnover from the firm's perspective. In this paper, I suggest that the labor market conditions for CEOs affect turnover outcomes. I use CEOs' positions on corporate executive and director networks to assess t...

I test whether corporate governance is ineffective in emerging markets by estimating the link between CEO turnover and firm performance for over 1,200 firms in eight emerging markets. I find two main results. First, CEOs of emerging market firms are more likely to lose their jobs when their firm’s performance is poor, suggesting that corporate governance is not ineffective in emerging markets. ...

This study examines the performance consequences of managerial turnover in firms operating in a weak institutional environment and facing pressures to restructure and downsize. A CEO promoted from within the firm has better knowledge of the organization than an outsider but may be bound by existing social ties with the workers. An outsider successor not burdened by such ties may grasp problems ...

This article investigates how the job histories of CEOs influence their capital allocation decisions when they preside over multidivisional firms. I find that, after CEO turnover, divisions not previously affiliated with the new CEO receive significantly more capital expenditures than divisions through which the new CEO has advanced. The pattern of reverse-favoritism in capital allocation is mo...