The percentage of S&P500 firms that offer ex-ante severance agreements to their CEOs grew from 20% in 1993 to more than 55% in 2007 despite controversial discussions on executive severance contracts in the media and academic studies. In addition, about 40% of firms offer their CEOs severance contracts with cash-only payouts. Our paper focuses on this recent spread of ex-ante CEO severance agree...

Despite intense scrutiny from investors, markets, and regulators, many public companies have no formal succession plans. Anecdotal evidence links risk to significant value destruction, but there is limited academic research evaluating the effects of planning on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover outcomes. We provide that reduces cost management transitions by improving their efficiency. Fir...

in this experiment two hundreds one day old broiler chicks (ross 308) in 5 treatments and 4 replicates were used based a completely randomized design. experimental treatments were: control treatment (basal diet), clove essential oil (ceo) at different levels (100, 300 and 500 mg/kg + basal diet) and 600 mg/kg flavophospholipol antibiotics (fpa) + basal diet. results showed that feed intake was ...

Although earnings persistence should have a nontrivial impact on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover decisions, prior studies paid little attention to the role of in CEO decisions. This study examines effect sensitivity (i.e., negative relation) performance. First, we find that forced turnovers performance is greater when are more persistent. We also show among numerous attributes, most dire...

We simultaneously analyze two mechanisms of the managerial labor market (CEO turnover and remuneration schemes) in two different regulatory regimes, namely before and after the sweeping governance reforms adopted in the UK in the 1990s. We employ sample selection models to examine firms in a pre-Cadbury Code period (1988-1993) and a post-Combined Code period (1998-2004). CEOs’ compensation and ...

The CEO’s control over information in the boardroom limits the board’s ability to monitor the CEO. We examine how CEOs’ incentives to hide negative information from the board depend on their compensation structure, and how the board can structure CEO compensation optimally to mitigate the problem. The optimal compensation package consists of options and severance pay. Option pay forces the CEO ...

BACKGROUND The relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) succession and hospitals' competitive performance is an area of interest for health services researchers. Of particular interest is the impact on overall strategic direction and health system performance that results from selecting a CEO from inside the firm as opposed to seeking outside leadership. Empirical work-to-date has yie...