auctions have been as a competitive method of buying and selling valuable or rare items for a long time. single-sided auctions in which participants negotiate on a single attribute (e.g. price) are very popular. double auctions and negotiation on multiple attributes create more advantages compared to single-sided and single-attribute auctions. nonetheless, this adds the complexity of the auctio...

In his book ' The theory of Political Coalitions', Riker (1962) introduces the theorem of minimal winning coalition, a game theoretic approach in which rational agents are proved to form coalitions that minimal winning. Mathematical evidence of this theorem have been provided by Austen-Smith and Banks (1988). In this paper we extend Austen-Smith and Banks' model such that, at the legislative co...

We study the formation of supplier coalitions in the context of a buyer-centric procurement market. Considered under a second-price descending seal-bid auction, we propose a two-stage auction mechanism that allows suppliers to form coalitions with one another. Building on the foundations of core games and bidding-rings, we explore the idea of “managed collusion” which provides a means to enhanc...

In an electronic marketplace coalition formation allows buyers to enjoy a price discount for each item while combinatorial auction enables buyers to place bids for a bundle of items that are complementary. Coalition formation and combinatorial auction both help to improve the e ciency of a market and have received much attention from economists and computer scientists. But neither in laboratori...

In this paper, we view the party charged with forming a governing coalition immediately following an election as attempting to put together a coalition that will, with some compromise, promote its ability to implement its legislative agenda and to inžuence the legislative outcome in this direction. We thus view the problem of the coalition leader as one of maximizing its inžuence as measured by...

We investigate collaborative multi-agent systems and how they can use simple, scalable negotiation protocols to coordinate in a fully decentralized manner. Specifically, we study multi-agent distributed coalition formation. We summarize our past and ongoing research on collaborative coalition formation and describe our original distributed coalition formation algorithm. The present paper focuse...

We consider hedonic coalition formation games with variable sets of agents and extend the properties competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity (introduced by Klaus, 2011, for roomate markets) to hedonic coalition formation games. Then, we show that on the domain of solvable hedonic coalition formation games, the Core is characterized by coalitional unanimity and Maskin monotonicity (see ...

This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the ”coalition unanimity” game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2000). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs of the game of coalition formation. We show that if no synergies are generated ...

We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We de…ne the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network speci…es the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict th...

This chapter gives a flavour of recent theoretical work on coalition formation and political parties. I survey recent work on both pre-election coalition formation and post election coalition (or government) formation. A number of alternative rationales for the formation of parties are compared with the help of some illustrative examples. JEL Classification:C71, C72, C78, D71, D72, D78