For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation which we call enforceable dominance is employed.

CONTEXT Physical activity coalitions are increasingly forming to meet the demands associated with policy, systems, and environmental change necessary to realize increases in population levels of physical activity. Little is known about what makes physical activity coalitions successful; however, evidence from community-based coalitions in other public health domains suggests that factors relate...

We study coalition formation processes of Konishi and Ray (2003) [27]. It is shown that an absorbing and deterministic process of coalition formation that also forms an equilibrium – satisfies a coalitional one-deviation property – does exist if one allows the process to be history dependent. All such dynamic equilibrium processes of coalition formation are characterized. Absorbing outcomes of ...

Talocalcaneal coalition often leads to a flatfoot deformity in children. Previous reports have uncovered many aspects of tarsal coalition and flatfoot respectively, including the etiology, clinical presentation, and diagnostic imaging, as well as treatment. However, the optimum surgical procedure for talocalcaneal coalition combined with flatfoot has not been definitively determined. The noncon...

Farsighted stability of Chwe (1994) is discussed while attention is played on the computational framework of finding farsightedly stable coalition structures. The idea of farsightedness means that one should check for multi-step stability by comparing the profits of a coalition member after a series of deviations has come to an end. The deviation is possible only if players display a cooperate ...