The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition to each player, i.e., how to find an adequate solution concept, ta...

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there i...

In a dynamic coalition environment, it is essential to allow automatic sharing of resources among coalition members. The challenge is to facilitate such sharing while adhering to the security policies of each coalition. To accomplish this, a dynamic coalition-based access control (DCBAC) has been proposed earlier, where security policies enforced by each coalition member are published in a cent...

In this paper we address the problem of coalition formation in hedonic context. Our modelling tries to be as realistic as possible. In previous models, once an agent joins a coalition it would not be able to leave the coalition and join the new one; in this research we made it possible to leave a coalition but put some restrictions to control the behavior of agents. Leaving or staying of an age...

The conventional model of coalition formation considers every possible subset of agents as a potential coalition. However, in many real-world applications, there are inherent constraints on feasible coalitions: for instance, certain agents may be prohibited from being in the same coalition, or the coalition structure may be required to consist of coalitions of the same size. In this paper, we p...

Coalition analysis is extended to incorporate uncertain preference into three stability concepts, general metarationality (GMR), symmetric metarationality (SMR), and sequential stability (SEQ) under the paradigm of the graph model for conflict resolution. As a follow-up analysis in the graph model, coalition analysis aims to assess whether equilibriums under individual calculations are vulnerab...

Abstract Scholars of international relations have long recognized the importance soft power in great powers’ hegemonic designs. In contrast, we know little middle employment noncoercive strategies attraction and, particular, how operates context middle-power antagonism. We suggest that, first, enhances coalition-building for powers. Contrary to expectations that states join forces against a sha...

In April 2018, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) reached agreement on its Initial Strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping. The was a success for EU, as it achieved long-term objective of reaching an greening However, several factors call into question whether “success” result role played by EU. Using process-tracing, we provide insight and mechanism t...

We describe an educational game in collaborative logistics. The game is based on an award winning application in cost allocation in forest transportation. The purpose of the game is to get an understanding of negotiation, coalition building and cost/profit sharing when the players have different power and hold different levels of information. The game is played with each player representing a s...

Confronted by continuing health disparities in vulnerable communities, Community Health Councils (CHC), a nonprofit community-based organization in South Los Angeles, worked with the African Americans Building a Legacy of Health Coalition and research partners to develop a community change model to address the root causes of health disparities within the community's African American population....