It is not uncommon in private company and acquisition valuations to see large premiums attached to estimated value to reflect the “value of control.” But what, if any, is the value of control in a firm, and, if it exists, how do we go about estimating it? In this paper, we argue that the value of controlling a firm has to lie in being able to run it differently (and better). Consequently, the v...

This research examines the factors that are important to the corporate governance of information technology. It focuses on those aspects of IT management that will be relevant to senior management and governing boards. The paper uses data from a survey of 817 Australian commercial and industrial organisations, and analyses the responses to questions about a number of key processes identified by...

One important role of corporate governance is to ensure that real options are exercised in the interest of the shareholders. This paper explores whether and how this can be achieved in start-up firms by the venture capitalist retaining a post-IPO equity stake. Our setting is a firm whose future prospects are uncertain and strategic choices remain to be made. The payoff to entrepreneur and share...

The document considers the performance and effectiveness of Ukrainian companies on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. With this end in view, the document examines the following issues: raising capital for investment, eliminating barriers for the Polish investors, capitalizing product reputation on the market, increasing investor recognition of companies, enhancing the corporate image. The document also...

Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in U.S., there has been a general tendency to globally harmonize regulations and practices of board governance. The purpose of this study is to compare among countries how well the board of directors constrains earnings management. Using a sample of firms from 23 countries, we document some evidence that higher outside directorship on the board is associ...

In this paper, we investigate the effects of internal corporate governance on the length it takes to remove a CEO after the initial sign of poor firm performance. We find that firms that have a better quality of internal corporate governance are quicker to remove poor-performing CEOs. This result persists after controlling for other factors that might influence the CEO removal decision.