We argue that the decision to bribe bureaucrats depends on the frequency of corruption within a society. We provide a behavioral model to explain this conduct: engaging in corruption results in a disutility of guilt. This implies that people observe a lower probability to be involved in corruption if on average the guilt level of others within a country is higher. We also explore whether and to...

March 2, 2006 Abstract: Indonesia has a tradition of corruption among local officials who harass and collect bribes from firms. Corruption flourished in the Suharto, pre-democracy era. This paper asks whether local democratization that occurred after Suharto reduced corruption and whether specific local politics, over and above the effects of local culture, affect corruption. We have a firm lev...

This research combined three distinctly unique and separate measures of corruption into one corruption factor, so as to yield a robust measurement approach to further understand the political and socioeconomic variables of corruption. The findings show that a strong significant variable in measuring corruption is the personal marginal-tax rate, especially in hierarchical based nations. The high...

Corruption and good governance have been a widely debated topic in the study of emerging democracies worldwide. The importance of considering corruption in new democracies is highlighted by studies showing that corruption is associated with, among others, low trust in political institutions, economic costs and inefficiencies, and low interpersonal trust. This is particularly important for new d...

In this paper the authors examine the relationship between local corruption and multinational investment. They construct a model of regulatory capture that highlights the interaction between a corrupt regulator, a local dominant …rm and a multinational …rm. The model suggests that entry by a multinational could have a variety of e¤ects on corruption, both positive and negative. These include: d...

The endemic nature of corruption in developing countries and the potential damage this can cause if it remains entrenched is not in question. In the search for policy responses attention has increasingly turned to the possible role of civil society in controlling corruption. The argument is that if civil society can be strengthened and its efforts at monitoring the state encouraged, this would ...

This paper uses panel data from African countries and a dynamic panel estimator to investigate the effects of corruption on economic growth and income distribution. I find that corruption decreases economic growthdirectly and indirectly through decreased investment in physical capital. A unit increase in corruption reduces the growth rates of GDP and per capita income by between 0.75 and 0.9 pe...

Virtually all forms of corruption are proscribed by virtually all countries. Why, then, don’t countries optimally reduce corruption? If countries have trouble fighting corruption, it may be because of insufficient will or insufficient local capacities of several kinds. These capacities include having proper strategies and structures (including incentive structures) that would optimally inhibit ...

Previous studies obtained mixed results regarding the association between collectivism and corruption. To make sense of the mixed results, the current research examined the moderating role of evaluation apprehension on the relationship between collectivism and corruption. Study 1, using a bribery scenario, indicated that collectivism facilitated corruption only when evaluation apprehension was ...

In this dissertation I study corruption in the public sector in Sweden, a country which the literature regards as having few corruption problems. Sweden is therefore classified as a “least corrupt” case, and such countries are seldom studied in corruption research. My work is thus an effort to fill a gap in the literature. This research is also motivated by a conviction that such a case provide...