Abstract This paper studies the effect of trade opportunities on a seller’s incentive to acquire information through experimentation. I characterize unique equilibrium outcome and discuss effects variations in structure probability trade. The main result is that more accurate for buyer can reduce social welfare. Efficiency requires offers price seller always accepts experiments when it socially...

We describe an agent-based microeconomic simulation of a local market. Consumers and Sellers are represented as agents in the Aglets framework. Consumers follow a Cobb-Douglas utility function, and they choose the seller that best matches their desired combination of goods and services. Different sellers provide different combinations of goods and services. The amount of money available to cons...

Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good. Time is discrete, each period has length δ, and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and sellers enter the market to trade. Within a period each buyer is matched with a seller and each seller is matched wit...

Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good. Time is discrete, each period has length δ, and each unit of time continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry. Traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter. Within a ...

Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good. Time is discrete, each period has length δ, and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and sellers enter the market to trade. Within a period each buyer is matched with a seller and each seller is matched wit...

Many markets that have traditionally relied upon collocation of buyers, sellers, and products have introduced electronic channels. Although these electronic channels may provide benefits to buyers and sellers by lowering the transaction costs of participating in the market, there are trade-offs related to quality uncertainty and increased risk that may limit the adoption of the electronic chann...

With a reverse-pricing mechanism (sometimes referred to as a Name-Your-Own Price or NYOP format), a prospective buyer submits a bid for a seller’s product, and a sale occurs only if the bid exceeds a hidden threshold price. This paper models the impact of three factors in such a market: 1) customer sophistication, i.e., whether buyers can correctly anticipate the seller’s procedure for setting ...

the seller must deliver the goods in conformity with the contract. one of cases of conformity is its conformity with the contract in terms of quantity. namely, the seller must deliver the goods that are equal with the specified amount in the contract. in practice, the delivered goods may be larger than the amount specified in the contract. in iranian law, where the goods are larger than contrac...

We study the interaction between the seller of a product, the buyers who are uncertain about the product quality and a rating agency who observes the quality and sends signals about it. Assuming the seller-pays model of rating agency, we analyze the cases in which the payment to the rater is publicly disclosed and fixed, publicly disclosed and rating-contingent, private and rating-contingent. F...