In this paper, we construct a political-economy model of international noncooperative environmental policymaking, and examine the strategic incentives for voters to elect an environmental policymaker in open economies. We show that under several circumstances, citizens have an incentive to deliberately vote for a candidate whose environmental preferences differ from their own. Further, the stra...

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Stellar scintillation is shown to be a good indicator of the upper-air winds near the tropopause. The exclusion principle is recast in the context of a generalized scheme for interspecific interactions.

Minimum standards set by a ‘World Environmental Organisation’ (WEO) and NGO labelling are promoted as alternative approaches to international environmental protection. We explore the potential inter-play between these two approaches when the WEO is subject to pressure from producers. We find that if WEO and NGO schemes are mutually exclusive then the existence of an NGO ‘alternative’ increases ...

Given self-protection from an undesirable environmental externality, we examine. under several conditions, the efficiency properties of cooperative and noncooperative behavior. We demonstrate that if self-protection can transfer the externality to another agent, then noncooperative behavior will lead to overprotection. If self-protection filters or dilutes the externality, then noncooperation l...

Publisher: Richard S. Nicholson Editor-in-Chief: Floyd E. Bloom W lnds of Change Editor: Ellis Rubinstein Managing Editor: Monica M. Bradford Deputy Editors: Philip H. Abelson (Engineering and ApBEIJING, CHINA-A broad path runs straight north from Tiananmen Square through arch plied Sciences); John I. Brauman (Physical Sciences); Thomas R. Cech (Biological Sciences) afterarch, splitting the For...