a r t i c l e i n f o We establish the effects of salaries on worker performance by exploiting a natural experiment in which some workers in a particular occupation (football referees) switch from short-term contracts to salaried contracts. Worker performance improves among those who move onto salaried contracts relative to those who do not. The finding is robust to the introduction of worker f...

A macroeconomic model is developed in which the psychological concept of loss aversion is incorporated into agents’ preferences. The impact of monetary policy in the presence of loss aversion depends on the specification of the reference wage. The plausible specification that a worker’s reference wage is the real wage she was paid in the previous period is considered in detail. We show that an ...

We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market give rise to rents in entrepreneurial activities involving capital. These rents motivate poor young a...

We study a labour market equilibrium model in which firms sign optimal long-term contracts with workers. Firms that are financially constrained offer an increasing wage profile: they pay lower wages today in exchange for higher future wages once they become unconstrained. Because constrained firms grow faster, the model predicts a positive correlation between the growth of wages and the growth ...

This paper studies the degree of downward rigidity in nominal wages in the United Kingdom using micro-data. Around 9% of employees who remain in the same job from one year to the next have zero pay growth. But on investigating the causes of rigidity we ®nd that up to ninetenths can be attributed to `symmetric' causes (such as contracts and menu costs) or to error. Thus only 1% of workers have p...

nowadays, belief in the criteria and conditions of interactions with an organization to promote customer relationships is somehow tied to the organizational performance, and its final goal is of great importance. in the literature on organizational behavior, this belief is defined as the “psychological contract”. the intention of this mixed research is to identify and discover the contents of p...